In opposition to all this it may be affirmed firstly that every “conception” of the human mind is but the more or less clear consciousness of a _disposition to activity_, and is representative, not so much of the “features” of objects which might appear to be their “characteristics” from a purely theoretical point of view, as of the different ways in which objects have seemed to men to subserve the needs of their souls and bodies. The study of the development of the “concept” in connexion with the facts of memory and with the slow evolution of language, and with the “socialized percepts” of daily life will all tend to confirm this position. The phenomena of religion, for example, and all the main concepts of all the religions are to be studied _not merely as intellectual phenomena_, as solutions of some of the many difficulties of modern Agnosticism, or of modern Rationalism, or of modern Criticism, but as an expressive of the _modes of behaviour of human beings_ (with all their needs and all their ideals) towards the universe in which they find themselves, and towards the various beings, seen and unseen, which this universe symbolises to them. These phenomena and these conceptions are unintelligible, in short, apart from the various activities and cults and social practices and social experiences and what not, with which they have dealt from first to last. Then it is literally impossible to separate in the manner of Dr. Bosanquet the “predicate” of thought from the active relations sustained by things towards each other, or towards the human beings who seek to interpret these active relations for any or for all “purposes,” Dr. Bosanquet’s idea, however, of the relation of “mind” to “matter,” to use these _symbols_ for the nonce (for they are but such), is in the main purely “representational”[338] or intellectualistic.[339] To him “mind” seems to reflect either a “bodily content” or some other kind of “content”[340] that seems to exist for a “spectator” of the world, or for the “Absolute,” _rather than for the man himself as an agent_, who of course _uses_ his memories of himself, or his “ideal” of himself, _for renewed effort and activity_. One of the most important consequences of this unduly intellectualistic view of mind is that Dr. Bosanquet seems (both theoretically and practically) unable to see the place of “mind,” as “purpose,” in ordinary life,[341] or of the place of mind in evolution,[342] giving us in his difficult but important chapter on the “relation of mind and body” a version of things that approaches only too perilously close to Parallelism or Dualism, or even to Materialism.[343] And along with this quasi-“representational” or “copy-like” theory of mind there are to be associated his representational and intellectualistic views of the “self”[344] and the “universal”[345] and “spirit.”[346]