TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_. * Bold text is denoted by equals as in =bold=. * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS. * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected. * Original spelling was kept, but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant usage was found. * Footnotes have been renumbered into a single series. Each footnote is placed at the end of the paragraph which includes its anchor. PRINCIPIA ETHICA CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS C. F. CLAY, MANAGER LONDON: FETTER LANE, E.C. 4 [Illustration] NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO. BOMBAY } CALCUTTA } MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD. MADRAS } TORONTO: THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. TOKYO: MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA ALL RIGHTS RESERVED PRINCIPIA ETHICA BY GEORGE EDWARD MOORE LITT.D. CAMBRIDGE, HON. LL.D. ST ANDREWS, FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY, LECTURER IN MORAL SCIENCE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE “Everything is what it is, and not another thing” BISHOP BUTLER CAMBRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1922 _First Edition_ 1903 _Reprinted_ 1922 DOCTORIBUS AMICISQUE CANTABRIGIENSIBUS DISCIPULUS AMICUS CANTABRIGIENSIS PRIMITIAS D. D. D. AUCTOR PREFACE. It appears to me that in Ethics, as in all other philosophical studies, the difficulties and disagreements, of which its history is full, are mainly due to a very simple cause: namely to the attempt to answer questions, without first discovering precisely _what_ question it is which you desire to answer. I do not know how far this source of error would be done away, if philosophers would _try_ to discover what question they were asking, before they set about to answer it; for the work of analysis and distinction is often very difficult: we may often fail to make the necessary discovery, even though we make a definite attempt to do so. But I am inclined to think that in many cases a resolute attempt would be sufficient to ensure success; so that, if only this attempt were made, many of the most glaring difficulties and disagreements in philosophy would disappear. At all events, philosophers seem, in general, not to make the attempt; and, whether in consequence of this omission or not, they are constantly endeavouring to prove that ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ will answer questions, to which _neither_ answer is correct, owing to the fact that what they have before their minds is not one question, but several, to some of which the true answer is ‘No,’ to others ‘Yes.’