which consists in its own intrinsic badness; pleasure, conversely, is not _in itself_ a great good, but does make a great addition to the goodness of a whole in which it is combined with a good thing, quite apart from its own intrinsic value. =128.= But finally, it must be insisted that pleasure and pain are completely analogous in this: that we cannot assume either that the presence of pleasure always makes a state of things better _on the whole_, or that the presence of pain always makes it worse. This is the truth which is most liable to be overlooked with regard to them; and it is because this is true, that the common theory, that pleasure is the only good and pain the only evil, has its grossest consequences in misjudgments of value. Not only is the pleasantness of a state _not_ in proportion to its intrinsic worth; it may even add positively to its vileness. We do not think the successful hatred of a villain the less vile and odious, because he takes the keenest delight in it; nor is there the least need, in logic, why we should think so, apart from an unintelligent prejudice in favour of pleasure. In fact it seems to be the case that wherever pleasure is added to an evil state of either of our first two classes, the whole thus formed is _always_ worse than if no pleasure had been there. And similarly with regard to pain. If pain be added to an evil state of either of our first two classes, the whole thus formed is _always_ better, _as a whole_, than if no pain had been there; though here, if the pain be too intense, since that is a great evil, the state may not be better _on the whole_. It is in this way that the theory of vindictive punishment may be vindicated. The infliction of pain on a person whose state of mind is bad may, if the pain be not too intense, create a state of things that is better _on the whole_ than if the evil state of mind had existed unpunished. Whether such a state of things can ever constitute a _positive_ good, is another question. =129.= II. The consideration of this other question belongs properly to the second topic, which was reserved above for discussion namely the topic of ‘mixed’ goods. ‘Mixed’ goods were defined above as things, which, though positively good _as wholes_, nevertheless contain, as essential elements, something intrinsically evil or ugly. And there certainly seem to be such goods. But for the proper consideration of them, it is necessary to take into account a new distinction the distinction just expressed as being between the value which a thing possesses ‘_as a whole_,’ and that which it possesses ‘_on the whole_.’