When ‘mixed’ goods were defined as things positively good _as wholes_, the expression was ambiguous. It was meant that they were positively good _on the whole_; but it must now be observed that the value which a thing possesses _on the whole_ may be said to be equivalent to the sum of the value which it possesses _as a whole_, _together with_ the intrinsic values which may belong to any of its parts. In fact, by the ‘value which a thing possesses as a whole,’ there may be meant two quite distinct things. There may be meant either (1) That value which arises solely _from the combination_ of two or more things; or else (2) The total value formed by the addition to (1) of any intrinsic values which may belong to the things combined. The meaning of the distinction may perhaps be most easily seen by considering the supposed case of vindictive punishment. If it is true that the combined existence of two evils may yet constitute a less evil than would be constituted by the existence of either singly, it is plain that this can only be because there arises from the combination a positive good which is greater than the _difference_ between the sum of the two evils and the demerit of either singly: this positive good would then be the value of the whole, _as a whole_, in sense (1). Yet if this value be not so great a good as the sum of the two evils is an evil, it is plain that the value of the whole state of things will be a positive evil; and this value is the value of the whole, _as a whole_, in sense (2). Whatever view may be taken with regard to the particular case of vindictive punishment, it is plain that we have here _two distinct things_, with regard to _either_ of which a separate question may be asked in the case of every organic unity. The first of these two things may be expressed as _the difference_ between the value _of the whole thing_ and the sum of the value of its parts. And it is plain that where the parts have little or no intrinsic value (as in our first class of goods, §§ 114, 115), this difference will be nearly or absolutely identical with the value of the whole thing. The distinction, therefore, only becomes important in the case of wholes, of which one or more parts have a great intrinsic value, positive or negative. The first of these cases, that of a whole, in which one part has a great _positive_ value, is exemplified in our 2nd and 3rd classes of great unmixed goods (§§ 120, 122); and similarly the Summum Bonum is a whole of which _many_ parts have a great _positive_ value. Such cases, it may be observed, are also very frequent and very important objects of Aesthetic judgment; since the essential distinction between the ‘classical’ and the ‘romantic’ styles consists in the fact that the former aims at obtaining the greatest possible value for the whole, _as a whole_, in sense (1), whereas the latter sacrifices this in order to obtain the greatest possible value for some _part_, which is itself an organic unity. It follows