=40.= yet he gives a proof of the first proposition, which consists in (1) the fallacious confusion of ‘desirable’ with ‘desired,’ 66 =41.= (2) an attempt to shew that nothing but pleasure is desired. 67 =42.= The theory that nothing but pleasure is desired seems largely due to a confusion between the _cause_ and the _object_ of desire: pleasure is certainly not the sole _object_ of desire, and, even if it is always among the _causes_ of desire, that fact would not tempt anyone to think it a good. 68 =43.= Mill attempts to reconcile his doctrine that pleasure is the sole object of desire with his admission that other things are desired, by the absurd declaration that what is a means to happiness is ‘part’ of happiness. 71 =44.= Summary of Mill’s argument and of my criticism. 72 B. =45.= We must now proceed to consider the principle of Hedonism as an ‘Intuition,’ as which it has been clearly recognised by Prof. Sidgwick alone. That it should be thus incapable of _proof_ is not, in itself, any reason for dissatisfaction. 74 =46.= In thus beginning to consider what things are good in themselves, we leave the refutation of Naturalism behind, and enter on the second division of ethical questions. 76 =47.= Mill’s doctrine that some pleasures are superior ‘in quality’ to others implies both (1) that judgments of ends must be ‘intuitions’; 77 =48.= and (2) that pleasure is _not_ the sole good. 79 =49.= Prof. Sidgwick has avoided these confusions made by Mill: in considering his arguments we shall, therefore, merely consider the question ‘Is pleasure the sole good?’ 81 =50.= Prof. Sidgwick first tries to shew that nothing outside of Human Existence can be good. Reasons are given for doubting this. 81 =51.= He then goes on to the far more important proposition that no part of Human Existence, except pleasure, is desirable. 85 =52.= But _pleasure_ must be distinguished from _consciousness of pleasure_, and (1) it is plain that, when so distinguished, _pleasure_ is not the sole good; 87 =53.= and (2) it may be made equally plain that _consciousness of pleasure_ is not the sole good, if we are equally careful to distinguish it from its usual accompaniments. 90 =54.= Of Prof. Sidgwick’s two arguments for the contrary view, the second is equally compatible with the supposition that pleasure is a mere _criterion_ of what is _right_; 91