Principles of literary criticismRichards, I. A. (Ivor Armstrong)
Philosophy
Principles of literary criticism
Richards, I. A. (Ivor Armstrong)
Criticism
Since nothing can be concluded from a comparison of ‘This is
good’ with, let us say, ‘This is sought by an impulse belonging
to a dominant group’, let us see whether light can be gained
by considering analogous instances in which special distinct
ideas have for a time been thought indispensable only to yield
later to analysis and substitution. The case of Beauty is perhaps
too closely related to that of Good for our purpose. Those who
can persuade themselves that Good is an unique irreducible entity
might believe the same of Beauty. An episode in the theory of
the tides is more instructive. It was once thought that the moon
must have a peculiar Affinity with water: When the moon is full
the tides are higher. Clearly the seas swell in sympathy with
the increase of the moon. The history of science is full of mysterious
unique entities which have gradually evaporated as explanation
advanced.
The struggles of economists with ‘utility’, of mathematical philosophers
with ‘points’ and ‘instants’, of biologists with ‘entelechies’,
and the adventures of psycho-analysts with ‘the libido’ and ‘the
collective unconscious’ are instances in point. At present theoretical
psychology in particular is largely made up of the manipulation
of similar suspects. The Act of Judgment, the relation of Presentation,
Immediate Awareness, Direct Inspection, the Will, Feeling, Assumption,
Acceptance, are only a few of the provisional ultimates introduced
for convenience of discussion. Some of them may in the end prove
to be indispensable, but meanwhile they are not, to prudent people,
more than symbolic conveniences; theories dependent upon them
must not be allowed to shut off from investigation fields which
may be fruitful.
[15] Throughout this discussion ‘experience’ will be used in a
wide sense to stand for any occurrence in the mind. It is equivalent
to ‘mental state, or process.’ The term has often unfortunate
suggestions of passiveness and of consciousness, but many of
the ‘experiences’ here referred to would ordinarily be called
‘actions’ and have parts which are not conscious and not accessible
to introspection as important as those which are.
[16] A chief advocate of this view is Dr G. E. Moore, whose _Principia
Ethica_ and _Ethics_ contain brilliant statements of the position.
[17] Cf. F. Brentano, _The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong_,
pp. 12, 46.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account