Principles of literary criticismRichards, I. A. (Ivor Armstrong)
Philosophy
Principles of literary criticism
Richards, I. A. (Ivor Armstrong)
Criticism
A stimulus then must not be conceived as an alien intruder which
thrusts itself upon us and, after worming a devious way through
our organism as through a piece of cheese, emerges at the other
end as an act. Stimuli are only received if they serve some need
of the organism and the form which the response to them takes
depends only in part upon the nature of the stimulus, and much
more upon what the organism ‘wants’, i.e. the state of equilibrium
of its multifarious activities.
Thus experience has two sources which in different cases have
very different importance. So far as we are thinking about or
referring to certain definite things our behaviour in all probability
will only be appropriate (i.e. our thoughts true) in so far as
it is determined by the nature of the present and past stimuli
we have received from those things and things like them. So far
as we are satisfying our needs and desires a much less strict
connection between stimulus and response is sufficient. A baby
howls at first in much the same way, whatever the cause of his
unrest, and older persons behave not unlike him. Any occasion
may be sufficient for taking exercise, or for a quarrel, for
falling in love or having a drink. To this partial independence
of behaviour (from stimulus) is due the sometimes distressing
fact that views, opinions and beliefs vary so much with our differing
moods. Such variation shows that the view, belief or opinion
is not a purely intellectual product, is not due to thinking
in the narrower sense, of response that is governed by stimuli,
present or past, but is an attitude adopted to satisfy some desire,
temporary or lasting. Thought in the strictest sense varies only
with evidence: but attitudes and feelings change for all manner
of reasons.
The threefold division between the causes, character and consequences
of a mental event, conscious or unconscious, corresponds, with
certain qualifications, to the usual division in traditional
psychology of thought (or cognition), feeling, and will (or conation).
To be cognisant of anything, to know it, is to be influenced
by it; to desire, to seek, to will anything is to act towards
it. In between these two are the conscious accompaniments, if
any, of the whole process. These last, the conscious characters
of the mental event, include evidently both sensations and feelings.
(Cf. Chapter XVL, pp. 125-128.)
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