Principles of Political Economy, Vol. 2Roscher, Wilhelm
General
Principles of Political Economy, Vol. 2
Roscher, Wilhelm
Economics
From what we have said, it follows that the rent of the land of a
country is equal at least to the sum of all the differences between the
product of the least productive portions of capital which have been
necessarily laid out in the cultivation of the soil and the product of
the other portions more productively laid out by other husbandmen. It
may rise higher than this on account of a coalition among landowners or
immoderate competition among farmers, who may thereby be forced to
surrender a portion of their wages and interest on capital to the
former; but it can never lastingly fall below this amount. If the
landowners themselves were to surrender all claim to rent, the price of
agricultural products would not sink if the market was kept fully
supplied; and the excess obtained from the better land over and above
the cost of production would go, but only in the nature of a gift, to
the farmers, corn dealers and individual consumers.[152-1] Normal rent
is not to be explained by any mysterious or peculiar productiveness[152-2]
of the land that yields it, but on the contrary, by the fact that even
material forces unexhaustible in themselves, but which can be productive
only in combination with given parcels of land, uniformly oppose even
successively greater difficulties to every successive and additional
improvement.[152-3]
Moreover, the capital which becomes a part of the land to such an extent
that it cannot be separated from it, and perhaps not even distinguished
from it at sight, such for instance as has been laid out for purposes of
drainage or in the purchase of material intended to modify the nature of
the soil, partakes of the character of the land itself, and its yield
obeys the laws of rent. How frequently it happens that such improvements
made by the farmer without the least assistance from the owner of the
land permanently contribute to an increase of the rent. (§ 181.)[152-4]
[Footnote 152-1: Compare _J. Anderson_, An Inquiry into the
Nature of the Corn Laws, 1777. Extracts from the same in the
Edinburgh Review, LIV, 91 ff. On the other hand, _Buchanan_,
on Adam Smith, IV, 134, thinks that rent arises exclusively
from the monopoly of the owners, and that without it the
price of corn would be lower. It is certain, however, that
if the land of a country be considered as one great piece of
property, and under one great system of husbandry, the
products of the soil might be offered permanently at a price
corresponding to the average cost of production, on the
better and worse pieces of land. (_Umpfenback_, N. Oek.,
191.)]
[Footnote 152-2: _Malthus_, On the Policy of restricting the
Importation of foreign Corn, 1815. Additions, 1817, to the
Essay on the Principle of Population, III, ch. 8-12;
Principles, 217 ff.]
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