Capture at sea; Contraband of war; Privateering; Prize law; Prizes (Property captured at sea)
Rome's policy was directed toward the securing of order through law.
Discipline and authority were the fundamental principles on which
her greatness was founded. Her military policy was to subordinate
individuals to the general good, to make each soldier a cog in the
wheel working in harmony with the whole. Individual freedom of
action was curtailed not in the interests of humanity but in the
interests of the efficiency of the general army. Her rules of prize
distribution are completely in harmony with these principles. No
private right of aggrandizement in war existed, all was controlled
by the state. The state was the combatant in war, the state bore
the losses and to the state accrued the gains. State authority
overshadowed every act of the individual.[22]
In practical effects the Roman laws of prize money probably
accomplished the purpose for which they were intended, that is,
they lessened the chance for insubordination among the soldiers.
Under them soldiers remained at their post of duty instead of going
on journeys of pillage. It made war regular and public instead of
guerrilla and private.
Humanitarian effects were slight or none at all. Though not impelled
by the hope of personal gain the Roman soldiers seem to have
captured, devastated and destroyed without compunction. Wheaton says
of Roman warfare, "Victory made even the sacred things of the enemy
profane, confiscated all his property, moveable and immoveable,
public and private, doomed him and his posterity to perpetual slavery
and dragged his kings and generals at the chariot wheels of the
conqueror thus depressing an enemy in his spirit and pride of mind,
the only consolation he has left when his strength and power are
annihilated."[23]
Though Roman warfare was cruel, it was regulated by law. Roman
civilization recognized the supremacy of the state, the public
character of regular war, and of immediate interest to the present
subject, the exclusive control by the state of all military
captures.
_NOTES._
Chapter I, Part 2.
[1] Antiquita Roma, vii, 63, quoted in Grotius, op. cit. iii, 124.
[2] Grotius, op. cit. iii, 127.
[3] Livy, xiv, 34, 40, 43, quoted in Grotius, op. cit. iii, 129.
[4] Heroditus, ix, 80, quoted in Grotius, op. cit. iii, 130.
[5] Dionysius of Halicarnassus, v, 47, quoted, in Grotius, op. cit.
iii, 134.
[6] Livy, v, 23, quoted in Grotius, op. cit. iii, 135; Phillipson,
op. cit. ii, 238.
[7] Apud Dionysius of Halicarnassus Excerpt, p. 714, quoted in
Grotius, op. cit. iii, 131.
[8] Polybius, History, x, 16, quoted in Grotius, op. cit. iii, 138.
[9] Cato, xi, 18; Cicero, Verres, iv, 41, quoted in Grotius, op. cit.
iii, 137, 138.
[10] Livy, xliv, 45; xlv, 34, quoted in Grotius, op. cit. iii, 133.
[11] Livy, v, 20, quoted in Grotius, op. cit. iii, 134.
[12] Cald. Cons. 85, quoted in Grotius, op. cit. iii, 140.
[13] Digest, xiv, 3, quoted in Charles Calvo, Le Droit International
Theorique et Pratique, 5th Edition, 6 Vols., Paris, 1896, i, 15.
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