By this method, not only is the voter saved from needless confusion and enabled to concentrate his attention upon the few big offices, but the responsibility for misgovernment is far more clearly fixed, and the possibility of remedying it made much easier. If a dozen state officials are elected, the average citizen is uncertain who is to blame for inefficiency; each official shoves the responsibility on to the others' shoulders, and it is not plain what can be done except to depose them all, one by one. If a governor only is elected, and is required to appoint his subordinates, the entire blame rests upon his shoulders. If dishonesty or misadministration is discovered, he must take the shame; he may be recalled from office if he is not quick enough in removing the guilty man and remedying the evil. Further, the right to choose his own subordinates makes the work of the chief much easier, brings a unity of purpose into an administration which is likely to be absent when a number of different men, simultaneously elected, perhaps representing different parties, have to work together. The increased power and responsibility of the chief offices attract able men, men of ideals and training, who do not care for an office whose power is limited by that of various machine politicians who, they know, will hamper them on every side in their efforts for efficient administration. And, apart from this consideration, a man able enough to win election as governor is a far better judge of the men best fitted for the various technical duties that fall to his subordinates than is the general public. Experience shows that the men chosen by chiefs who are elected and held responsible to the people are generally abler than those elected to the same positions by popular vote.