We know now that we were galvanized into common action by the shock of
attack; but to recoil from a blow, to huddle together for
self-protection, to cry for revenge--are not the signs of a national
unity. Before the war was three months old it was clear that we were
not united on any question; while we all intended to win the war, the
new appeasers had arrived--who wanted to buy themselves off the
consequences of war by not fighting it boldly; or by fighting only
Japan; or fighting Japan only at Hawaii; we disagreed about the
methods of warfare and the purpose of victory; there were those who
wanted the war won without aid from liberals and those who would
rather the war were lost than have labor contribute to victory; and
those who seemed more interested in preventing profit than in creating
munitions; it was a great chance "to put something over"--possibly the
radicals could be destroyed, possibly the rich; possibly the President
or his wife could be trapped into an error, possibly a sales tax would
prevent a new levy on corporations, possibly labor could maneuvre
itself into dominance; the requirements of war could be a good excuse
for postponing all new social legislation and slily dropping some of
the less vital projects; and the inescapable regimentation of millions
of people, the necessary propaganda among others, could be used as an
opportunity for new social experiments and indoctrination. In these
differences and in the bitterness of personal dislike, people
believed that the war could not be won unless their separate purposes
were also fulfilled; our activities were not designed to fit with one
another, and we were like ionized particles, held within a framework,
but each pulling away from the others.
The attack on Pearl Harbor silenced the pacifists; not even the most
misguided could suggest that the President had maneuvred Japan into
the attack; the direct cause of the war, including the war which Italy
and Germany declared on us, was self-protection. We were not fighting
for England, for the Jews, for the munition makers. But did we know
what we _were_ fighting for? The President had said that we did not
intend to be constantly at the mercy of aggressors; and the Atlantic
Charter provided a rough sketch of the future. But we did not know
whether we were to be allied with Britain, reconstruct Europe, raise
China to dominance in the Far East, enter a supernational system,
withdraw as we did at the end of the last war, or simply make
ourselves the rulers of the world.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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