The revolution started by Balmaceda’s manifesto of January 1, 1891, was apparently poorly prepared to cope with the government. The insurgents had no military organization, no arms or munitions of war. The junta proceeded north and took possession of the provinces of Tarapaca, Atacama and Antofagasta, which include the rich nitrate fields and wealth producing mineral territory of Chile, the revenues from which were employed in purchasing arms, provisions and equipment for an army. They also had possession of the majority of the naval squadron. By the middle of the year 1891 the government had 45,000 troops in the field, four thousand of which were cavalry. The revolutionists had only about twelve thousand soldiers, which encouraged the sanguine Balmaceda to believe that he could easily suppress the uprising. Congressional elections were held in May, and a majority of the members elected were in sympathy with the administration. In June presidential electors were chosen, and they selected as the candidate for president Don Claudio Vicuña, who was Balmaceda’s choice for his successor. Señor Vicuña, who was of an old and distinguished family, was declared duly elected president on July 25, 1891, but the final success of the insurgents prevented him from ever taking his seat. As the struggle continued the revolutionary cause gained strength and reinforcements from various sources. The superior skill of the military officer directing the opposition forces made itself manifest, and the position of Balmaceda and his government became daily more and more menaced with dissolution and overthrow. On August 20, ten thousand revolutionary troops were disembarked at Quintero, a few miles from Valparaiso, and on the following day a decisive battle was fought, at Concon, situated at the mouth of the Aconcagua River, resulting in the defeat of the government forces. This crushing defeat, in which about 2,500 of the government troops were killed, practically caused the fall of Balmaceda. He made a strenuous and brave effort to recover from the disaster, but the railway communication having been destroyed, it was impossible to send reserve troops from the south, where they had been stationed, in time to save the situation.