Developmental research had a great deal to offer, but the gap between initial scientific advance and practical military application appeared to be too broad to warrant the assumption that the research had transformed the U.S. PsyWar program. =Operations Research in Korea.= Operations research--sometimes slangily called _opsearch_--was applied to the Korean war with highly uneven results.[58] Among other things, Army officers in the PsyWar field showed, early in the Korean war, that land forces possessed tactical opportunities which combat propaganda could exploit very effectually. Various experiments were tried, none of them so decisive as to affect the outcome of the war, but some of them of real tactical value and others of great importance in obtaining Chinese prisoners. One of the points examined was surrender as a _process_. Surrendering does not depend upon the disposition of the individual enemy soldier to say _yes_ or _no_ to the war as a whole. He could say _no_ a thousand times and still be on the other side shooting at us. The actual physical _process_ of surrender is an elaborate one consisting of the psychological processes of getting ready to give up on the other side, the physical capacity to surrender when the opportunity for getting captured presents itself, and the alternative, more difficult process of deliberately leaving the other side and getting to our side alive. In 1951 and 1952 there were considerable developments along this line. Americans learned much about how to teach enemy soldiers to surrender. Late in 1952 and early in 1953 the front had become so static that it took extraordinary heroism for soldiers--outside of a tiny minority engaged in reconnaissance patrols--to get away from their own side and surrender to the enemy without being killed by their friends as deserters or by the enemy as sneak attackers. The U.S. public did not realize that throughout the Korean war the Communists--Russian, North Korean, and Chinese--enjoyed a distinct radio advantage over the UN side both as to funds available for programs and as to number of station-hours on the air. The language gap between the Americans and Chinese was so extreme that it was hard for Americans to realize that the Chinese broadcasts covered wider audiences and covered them better than did our own. American restraint in this field may have been dictated in part by the fact that the war was a limited war consisting of combat only with those armed Chinese Communists on North Korean territory, but not with armed Chinese Communists elsewhere in the Far East.