Psychology: an elementary text-bookEbbinghaus, Hermann
Science
Psychology: an elementary text-book
Ebbinghaus, Hermann
Psychology
This complex idea of a personal world, of personality, which constantly
increases in content, is given a special name, John or Mary, and still
later another name, _I_. The unity of the idea of personality, the
readiness of its appearance in consciousness in spite of the multitude
of its contents, is greatly enhanced by this name. The idea _I_ becomes
the omnipresent and dominating factor in consciousness. I can see
nothing, hear nothing, imagine nothing without, however vaguely,
thinking that it is _I_ who reads, _I_ who answers, _I_ who designs. It
is altogether impossible to express such thoughts in language without
reference to the _I_ or the _mine_. In the ecstasy of the mystic or the
mental exaltation of the insane, the idea of _I_ may be absent, but
never under normal conditions at an age beyond that of infancy.
Consciousness in which the idea of _I_ is rather pronounced is commonly
called self-consciousness.
It is plain enough that thinking of the other half of the world, other
than the self, is also facilitated by such names as “the world,” “the
external world.” But the concept of the external world does not easily
attain the unity of the concept of self, because the experiences
referred to are too changeable in comparison with those referred to by
_I_. We speak of the external world chiefly in order to distinguish it
from the self, not because of the unity of its conception.
The extraordinary support which the consciousness of self receives from
language has had also a certain undesirable consequence. We have
mentioned in an earlier chapter the universal desire to imagine the
world as being under the power of innumerable demons. The consciousness
of the self thus leads naturally to the thought of a demon who inhabits
the human body. When a person under ordinary conditions is conscious of
the _I_, there is no time for its content to unfold itself to any
considerable extent. Usually one small group of ideas enters
consciousness, even when I ask myself the question as to what I am:
ideas of a certain visual appearance, a certain position in society, a
certain age, certain aims in life. It seems then that the concept of
self is exceedingly simple. This apparent simplicity gives aid to the
idea of the existence of a simple demon, independent of time, eternal,
inhabiting and governing this body as long as its organs are held
together by their normal physiological functions, after the body’s death
going elsewhere--whither, we do not know. But this conclusion as to the
existence of a simple, unitary subjective reality is no more justifiable
than the statement that, because of the simplicity of the idea _it_ in
ordinary language, there must be an absolutely simple objective reality
which corresponds to it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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