Magistrate No. 1 notices all these things and says to himself: “The prisoner has no self-control; he is in fear, he is passionate, he is charged with a crime of passion, he is guilty!” But magistrate No. 2 also notices all these things and says to himself: “The prisoner is indignant, he feels his position acutely, for he is a respectable man; he fears the consequences the more because he is an innocent man; I am for his acquittal, but I am not sure, for his bearing is compatible with guilt or innocence.” Magistrate No. 3 has been eagerly looking for some proof of subconsciousness, and not having discovered any, he is uninterested in the mental equation that excites his colleagues. Happy will that Bench be if it possesses a common-sensed old chairman who has not graduated in criminal psychology: who is content to be guided entirely by the actual evidence; and happy will it be for the innocent prisoner too! So far as I have read these “manuals,” and so far as my personal experience goes—and it is not a short one—I have discovered no outward and visible signs that indicate a prisoner’s guilt that may not at the same time be taken as an indication of the prisoner’s innocence. But supposing that our worthy magistrates, not being satisfied on psychological grounds, or for other reasons, decide to commit the prisoner for trial by judge and jury. Why, then, there will be curious happenings if judge and jury, with prosecuting and defending counsel, have been trained as per “manual.” For the psychology of the various witnesses must be examined, declared and rebutted. The mentality of the police must be exposed, dilated upon, attacked and defended, and a clever lawyer would find ample scope for his ability by probing and peering into the mind of his lordship the judge. Really there would be no end to the possibilities, and a pretty state of things would eventuate, for the jury, although having previously given satisfactory proof that their minds were in good working order, would before the end be reduced to a psychological state bordering on imbecility, and would be rendered quite incapable of any but a confused judgment. No, I am not exaggerating, for one “manual” in my possession gives instruction upon all these and hundreds of other useless points. This may be considered as psychology run mad; nevertheless, it is a state of things that is likely to come about if we are guided by scientists, and the present trend is certainly in this direction. Let me, therefore, before it is too late, register a protest against the assumption that it is necessary for our judges and magistrates to be trained in what is not and can never be an exact science: criminal psychology.