Psychopathology and politicsLasswell, Harold D. (Harold Dwight)
Science
Psychopathology and politics
Lasswell, Harold D. (Harold Dwight)
Personality and politics; Political science; Psychoanalysis; Psychology, Pathological
Subjective events occupy definite positions in the flow of events, and
the problem of explanation is the problem of locating stable relations.
Since subjective events are not open to direct observation, but are
inferred from movements, the observer, O, must infer the existence of
subjective terms in the sequence by imagining what he would experience
under all the similar circumstances which he can survey and compare
to his own experience. Reduced to its simplest terms, the observer’s
procedure is that of isolating a subjective event which he wishes to
investigate, and of searching for the “externals” which will make
the conditions of its occurrence clearly communicable to others.
These externals are sometimes fairly clear, and can readily be stated
in precise, “touchable” form. The sensation of “roughness” can be
predicted to follow the application of certain objects to specified
parts of the skin. A transition from a rough to a smooth object may
also produce “flinching,” which can be somewhat definitely described,
and which accompanies and (perhaps) initiates some of the subjective
events.
When any observer undertakes to talk about the state, he may choose
specific subjective experiences, such as a sense of loyalty to a
community, and say that all who have this experience (and/or certain
others) under specified conditions make up the state. Such specified
conditions may include the act of testifying to it when asked by an
intimate friend, or when warned that the community is in danger. The
concept of the state may be amplified by searching for the external
circumstances which precipitate the appearance of the subjective events
which are characteristic of stateness.
Such a method of defining the state absolves us from “superindividual”
constructs. The locus of the subjective events is still individual.
The group is not a superindividual phenomenon but a many-individual
phenomenon. The time-space abstraction of the “group” is just as “real”
or “unreal” as the time-space abstraction called the “individual.”
They are both equally real or unreal, and they stand and fall together.
The state has duration. It is a time-space frame of reference for
individual events. Particular individuals may pass on, but if the
overwhelming majority of those who occupy a certain geographical
area continue to experience the subjective events of the type chosen
as critical for the state, the state endures. The state is thus
independent of any one individual, but it ceases to exist when enough
individuals change their minds or die without procreating.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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