The same order and consequence exist in all cases, whether the events have a general or only a particular operation; and it may therefore well be demanded, why prescience is believed to be possible as far as it regards general events, and why it is allowed to be serviceable in preparing for their approach; while in particular instances its power and use are altogether denied. That the weather and the seasons, and the indications of the fixed stars, as well as the configurations of the Moon, afford means of prognostication, many persons admit; and they exercise this foreknowledge for their own preservation and comfort, adapting their constitutions to the expected temperature, by cooling and refreshing things for the summer, and by warm things for the winter. They also watch the significations of the fixed stars, to avoid dangerous weather, in making voyages by sea; and they notice the aspects of the Moon, when at the full, in order to direct the copulation of their herds and flocks, and the setting of plants or sewing of seeds: and there is not an individual who considers these general precautions as impossible or unprofitable. Still, however, these same persons withhold their assent to the possibility of applying prescience to particular cases; such, for instance, as any particular excess or diminution of cold or heat, whether arising out of the peculiar temperament producing the original cold or heat, or from the combination of other properties; nor do they admit that there are any means of guarding against many of these particular circumstances. And yet, if it be clear that persons, who prepare themselves by cooling things, are less affected by any general heat of the weather, there seems no reason for supposing that a similar preparation would not be equally effectual against any particular conjuncture oppressed by immoderate heat. It appears, however, that this idea, of the impracticability of attaining foreknowledge of particular circumstances, must originate solely in the mere difficulty of the acquirement; which difficulty is certainly rendered peculiarly arduous by the necessity of conducting the enquiry with the greatest accuracy and precision: and to this it must be added, that, as there is rarely found a person capable of arranging the whole subject so perfectly that no part of the opposing influence can escape his attention, it frequently happens that predictions are not properly regulated by due consideration of that opposing influence, and that the effects are at once considered fully liable to be brought to pass, agreeably to the primary agency and without any intervention. This defect, of not sufficiently considering the opposing influence, has naturally induced an opinion that all future events are entirely unalterable and inevitable. But, since the foreknowledge of particular circumstances, although it may not wholly claim infallibility, seems yet so far practicable as to merit consideration, so the precaution it affords, in