There are certain words which are so universally considered injurious to a person in his social or business relations if spoken of him that the courts have held that the speaker of such words is liable to an action for slander, and damages are recoverable even though the one of whom the words were spoken does not prove that he suffered any special damage from the words having been spoken of him. The speaking of such words is said to be actionable _per se_. In short, all the world knows that it is injurious to a man to speak such words of him, and the court does not require proof of facts which all the world knows. Such words are (1) those imputing an infamous crime; (2) those disparaging to a person in his trade, business, office, or profession; and (3) those imputing a loathsome disease. Thus, to say that a man is a murderer is to impute to him an infamous crime, and if he brings a suit for slander, it is not necessary for him to prove that he has been damaged by the statement. The result is the same if one says that a person will not pay his debts, because that injures him in his profession or business; or that a man has the leprosy, because that is imputing to him a loathsome disease. From early times, it has been held to be slander, actionable _per se_, to say of a white man that he is a Negro or akin to a Negro. The courts have placed this under the second class—that is, words disparaging to a person in his trade, business, or profession. The first case in point arose in South Carolina[44] in 1791, when the courts held that, if the words were true, the party (the white person) would be deprived of all civil rights, and moreover, would be liable to be tried in all cases, under the “Negro Act,” without the privilege of a trial by jury, and that “any words, therefore, which tended to subject a citizen to such disabilities, were actionable.” In 1818, it was held actionable by a court of the same State to call a white man’s wife a mulatto.[45] But an Ohio[46] court, the same year, held that it was not slander, actionable _per se_, to charge a white man with being akin to a Negro inasmuch as it did not charge any crime or exclude one from society. The only explanation, apparently, of this conflict between the decisions of South Carolina and Ohio is that in the latter State it was not considered as much an insult to impute Negro blood to a white man as in the former. In North Carolina,[47] in 1860, there was the surprising decision that it was not actionable _per se_ to call a white man a free Negro, even though the white man was a minister of the gospel. The Supreme Court of Louisiana,[48] in 1888, said: “Under the social habits, customs, and prejudices prevailing in Louisiana, it cannot be disputed that charging a white man with being a Negro is calculated to inflict injury and damage.... No one could make such a charge, knowing it to be false, without understanding that its effect would be injurious and without intending to injure.”