is to this latter judgment that we must in the end conform. The plan of President Harris was not so inadequate as might at first appear; it accomplished much that needed to be accomplished, and it gave an opportunity to the management of the road to retrace many of the steps of the previous two years; but on the other hand, it did not embrace the chance to free the Reading from all its mistaken enterprises, and passed by an occasion which could only again occur after much suffering and loss. Discussion turned, however, on other features. In a circular to securityholders in June, President Harris said: “My deliberate opinion is that the assistance asked for by the proposed plan ... is none too great, and that there is a good probability that if it is afforded and the plan is carried out prudent and careful management may prevent the recurrence of such a crisis. My judgment is that the securityholders will make a very serious mistake if they do not accept the relief offered them, for I see no probability that the necessary assistance can hereafter be obtained except upon much more onerous terms. I strongly advise that the plan shall be promptly accepted.”[259] “We cannot but regard these terms as very easy,” said the _Financial Chronicle_. “To be sure a new collateral trust mortgage for $30,000,000, bearing 6 per cent, is to be created, but the greater part of this goes to take up floating debt and other existing obligations, and will involve no increase in fixed charges....”[260] On the other hand, it was objected that the plan was formed entirely in the interest of the floating debt holders, income bondholders, and stockholders; and that the management under the arrangement would have the power to pay dividends upon the income bonds, while at the same time the coupons on the 4 per cent mortgage bonds were being funded.[261] In an editorial urging foreclosure proceedings the London _Standard_ said: “That [foreclosure] will prevent holders of pledged collaterals from getting a market for their securities, and, at the same time, bring a good many doubtful matters connected with the finances of the company into the light of day. It should also tend to make the ‘floating debt’ swindle less popular with eminent American financiers. At present they pile these debts up in the full assurance that they can easily arrange matters so as to put them, when funded, before existing mortgages. It is for the Reading general mortgage bondholders to act promptly for their own interests.”[262] Finally, it was objected that the plan was in the interest of the McLeod management, and that the voting trust was to be a McLeod organization, which would either whitewash the ex-president’s operations, or by keeping them in the background would virtually outlaw them.