per cent in preferred stock; the Richmond & Danville consolidated 6s sold at 109 and received 120 per cent and 45 per cent. It is clear that the committee desired to reduce the interest which the various classes of bonds should have a right to demand, and that it expected to make compensation by means of preferred stock on which payments should be made if earned. So much of its scheme was commendable. On the other hand, the rates of exchange of old securities for new were in many cases ill-advised. The reduction in fixed charges was to be $1,819,837, although by the exchanges alone the capitalization was to be increased by over $50,000,000. The charges on the system had amounted in 1891 to $9,474,837.[356] Net earnings had been $8,744,736. Fixed charges under the plan were to amount to $7,666,000. As a matter of fact they would have been greater than this, for some of the old bonds would have remained outstanding, and the estimate did not include interest on any bonds issued for improvements. The floating debt was to be retired by the sale of new securities, namely, $18,235,800 new first mortgage bonds and $6,382,530 preferred stock. These were to net $14,588,640, or sufficient to cancel a debt of $6,310,000 and car trusts of $2,369,564 and to provide a balance for miscellaneous uses. A syndicate guaranteed the sale, but holders of stock or of collateral trust 5 per cent bonds were to be allowed to subscribe up to 16 per cent of their holdings at the rate of $800 for one new mortgage bond and $350 in new stock. New bonds to a maximum of $10,000,000 were to be issued only for the acquisition of additional property, while beyond this the vote of a majority of preferred stock was to be required to authorize any additional mortgage on property covered by the first mortgage.[357] Such was the plan laid before securityholders. It proposed a considerable reduction in fixed charges, though probably not enough to put the company out of danger, and a large increase in new securities. It failed because it imposed losses upon the wrong parties. As between the various classes of bonds its terms were frequently inequitable. As between the bonds and the stock it altogether favored the latter. It levied no assessment, it compelled no subscription to new securities, and in three cases only did it announce an intention of reducing the nominal value of the stockholders’ holdings.[358] The original time limit for deposits was set at April 14, 1892. This was subsequently extended, but without effect, and on May 16 the Olcott Committee announced that the plan had failed.[359]