Pending Mr. Little’s report, reorganization was of course delayed. The receivers were then in control,[67] and under their direction a vigorous policy of improvement was carried out. The rolling stock of the system was found to be insufficient to handle its business, and the motive power was in similar condition. All testified to the consistent desire of the old management to employ every device which might contribute to greater apparent earnings. Contracts for 5000 freight cars were let as early as May, 1896, to be paid for in receivers’ certificates, and bids for 75 locomotives were at the same time received.[68] During their whole administration the receivers purchased over 28,000 freight cars, 216 locomotives, 123,000 tons of rails, besides ties, ballast, new steel bridges, and miscellaneous improvements of various sorts.[69] On the financial side they had to resist an attempt to compel payment of dividends on the preferred stock. The case dragged on through 1897 and 1898, and was finally decided in favor of the company.[70] After the publication of Mr. Little’s report there remained no serious bar to reorganization, while the needs to be met were more apparent than ever before. If the proportion of charges to earnings had been too heavy on the management’s own showing, how much more burdensome was it when the reported earnings had been proved too high, and the reported liabilities too low! The first step after the appointment of receivers had been the springing up of reorganization committees. The two most prominent were the Fitzgerald Committee, representing the directors, and the Baltimore Committee. There were besides committees representing the 5 per cent bonds of the loan of 1885, the consolidated mortgage 5s, the 6 per cent bonds of 1874, the preferred stock, and others. These were all to some extent antagonistic. It was hoped to secure a reorganization without foreclosure, but to provide against all contingencies a bill was introduced and passed through the Maryland legislature, permitting a new company to succeed, after reorganization, to the property of the Baltimore & Ohio system. By April, 1898, a reorganization plan was ready, and was withheld only on account, first of the threatened, and then of the actual, war with Spain. Two months later this difficulty seemed no longer serious, and a plan was formally announced.[71] There were contemplated two great issues of bonds and two of stock as follows: 3½ per cent prior lien gold bonds, $70,000,000 4 per cent first mortgage gold bonds, 50,000,000 4 per cent non-cumulative preferred stock, 35,000,000 Common stock, 35,000,000