Railroads -- United States; Railroads -- United States -- Finance
in default of some assurance that the policy of the company should
be changed.[587] In reply the directors issued a lengthy statement
taking up the charges in detail. The policy of building branch lines,
said they, was imperatively necessary in order to develop business.
Although some of the branches had not earned their fixed charges, yet,
if they had been credited with 60 per cent of the gross earnings on
business which they had brought to the main line, they would have shown
a good profit. The policy of branch-line construction had met with the
unanimous approval of successive boards of directors, and had been
ratified by the stockholders in 1886; and in this connection the reply
defended specifically the acquisition of the Wisconsin Central and
other lines. The carrying of the floating debt by officials interested
in the property, instead of being subject to criticism and censure, was
entitled to the highest commendation.[588]
It is difficult to pass with justice upon the conflicting contentions
above outlined. However, writing in 1905, long after his retirement
from Northern Pacific affairs, Mr. Villard expressed himself as
follows: “In 1891 Mr. Villard ... made ... his last official tour of
inspection of the main line and principal branches of the Northern
Pacific.... The most alarming impression of all made upon him was the
revelation of the weight of the load that had been put upon the company
by the purchase and construction of the longer branch lines in Montana
and Washington, which he then discovered for the first time. There
was the Missoula branch to the Cœur d’Alene mines; the Cœur d’Alene
Railway & Navigation, a mixed system of steamboats and rail lines; the
Seattle, Lake Shore & Eastern; and the roads built into Westernmost
Washington; representing a total investment in cash and bonds of not
far from $30,000,000, which together hardly earned operating expenses.
The acquisition and building of these disappointing lines had in a
few years absorbed the large amount of consolidated bonds set aside
for construction purposes, which had been assumed to be sufficient
for all needs in that direction for a long time.”[589] No man should
have known the real profitableness of these extensions better than Mr.
Villard; and the circumstances of his account give it special weight.
The admitted fact that in several cases the managers of the Northern
Pacific voted as directors of that corporation to buy property from
themselves as whole or part owners in other enterprises also excites
distrust, and this feeling is strengthened by the unsatisfactory
financial condition in 1893 of the Northern Pacific system as a whole.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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