(6) Bond- and stockholders were to be urged to give power of attorney and proxies to Watkin, or to such other person or persons as the above representatives of the bond- and stockholders should designate; (7) Any scheme of reorganization was to include a provision giving bondholders a voting power. On the above resolutions Jewett, with his board, and Watkin, with his committee, agreed to coöperate.[101] Under the circumstances the increased power given the bondholders was both a natural and a just demand, and it is probable that Mr. Jewett’s prompt acquiescence in it had something to do with Sir Edward’s advice to the securityholders “to rely on the honor, as I feel you may also upon the anxious labors and full experience of the President and Receiver.” The report did not go uncriticised. It was pointed out, first, that a majority of English proprietors could not unhesitatingly share the confidence expressed in Mr. Jewett; second, that the first mortgage bondholders were well secured, and would surely refuse to fund their indebtedness; and third, that the payment of the floating debt, according to the Watkin plan, would simply create another debt of equal or greater amount due to the bondholders whose coupons were not paid. The only sound way, said a committee of bondholders in Dundee in a letter to the Watkin Committee, is resolutely to shun an accumulation of mortgage liabilities on the one hand, and on the other to give increased reality to the bonds and stocks of the company already existing as items in capital account, _i. e._ an assessment on the stock and a sweeping reduction in the interest on the bonds secured by the second mortgage:—the first mortgage bonds are in different case— they represent investment of cash instead of mere water, and even if foreclosure is difficult, they have beyond question an absolutely good security for the ultimate payment of both principal and interest.[102]