Is this assumption, then, a 'law of phenomena' in Mr. Balfour's sense? is it to be ruled out, on his principles, as not being founded on observation and experiment? and are men of science thereby shown to be wrong in holding that every scientific statement of the laws of phenomena is so founded? I do not see how he can thus argue; for he has expressly contended (p. 135), that 'A law of nature refers to a fixed relation, _not_ between the totality of phenomena, but between extremely small portions of that totality.' Is a law of phenomena, then, something other than a law of nature? This he cannot mean; and the conclusion is that the so-called 'law of universal causation' is not properly to be called a law of nature, or a law at all, unless we are so to call a necessary element of all reflection upon nature. The dispute here, in short, resolves itself into a question of terminology; and it is quite likely that many men of science, and many freethinkers, have used lax terminology. But as regards the reasonableness of their beliefs, or their way of believing, in contrast with those of the supernaturalists whom Mr. Balfour champions, he has thus far made out no hostile case whatever. And when we come to what appear to be his conclusions, they are such as can wring no rationalist's withers. Our ultimate premisses, he contends, are incapable of proof. Granted--if the assumption of universal causation is to be termed a premiss, as is that of the uniformity of nature. The practical issue for him appears to be contained in this passage (italics ours):-- 'That men ought not to give up on speculative grounds the belief in "the uniformity of nature, or any other great principle," I hold, as the reader will see if his patience lasts to the end of the volume, with as much persistence as any man. But I must altogether take exception to the statement, which is the central point of the argument just stated, namely, that the fact that these principles work in practice is _any ground for believing them to be even approximately true_' (p. 145). Our patience may easily stand the suggested test, since Mr. Balfour's book is for the most part extremely well written; and unless I have totally misunderstood him, his conclusions are (_a_) that he and we do well to accept the general body of accepted scientific doctrines, including those of the theory of evolution and the uniformity of nature, without _any ground for believing them to be even approximately true_; and (_b_) that he and his co-believers do equally well to hold what he vaguely indicates (p. 324) as 'the Theological opinions to which I adhere,' _also_ without 'any ground for believing them to be even approximately true.' In a sentence (p. 320) of which the diction is noticeably lax, he says:--