Since prices and contracts are expressed in terms of the standard article, it is clear that the legal-tender quality should not be equally affixed to different articles having different values, but called by the same name. This method would be sure to bring confusion, uncertainty, and injustice into trade and industry. No one who had made a contract would know in what he was to be paid. The legal-tender quality, then, should be confined to that which is the sole standard. And it is also obvious that when a standard is satisfactorily determined upon, and when various effective media of exchange, like bank notes, checks, or bills of exchange, have sprung up, the legal-tender quality should not be given to these instruments of convenience. They are themselves expressed in, and are resolvable into, the standard metal; so the power to satisfy debts should be given not to the shadow, but to the substance, not to the devices drawn in terms of the standard, but only to the standard itself, even though, as a matter of fact, nine-tenths of the debts and contracts are actually settled by means of these devices. So long as these instruments are convertible into, and thus made fully equal to, the standard in terms of which they are drawn, they will be used by the business community for the settlement of debts without being made a legal tender. And whenever they are worth less than the standard they certainly should not be made a legal tender, because of the injustice which in such a case they would work. Having shown that the legal-tender quality is only a necessary legal complement of the choice of a standard, it will not be difficult to see that the state properly chooses an article fit to have the legal-tender attribute for exactly the reasons that governed the selection of the same article as a standard. The whole history of money shows that the standard article was the one which had utility to the community using it. As the evolution of the money commodity went on from cattle to silver and gold, so the legal-tender provisions naturally followed this course. A state may select a valueless commodity as a standard, but that will not make it of value to those who would already give nothing for it; and so, it may give the legal-tender quality to a thing which has become valueless, but that will not of itself insure the maintenance of its former value. This proposition may, at first, appear to be opposed to a widely-spread belief; but its soundness can be fully supported. It should be learned that a commodity, or a standard, holds its value for reasons quite independent of the fact that it is given legal recognition. It has happened that legal recognition has been given to it because it possessed qualities that gave it value to the commercial world, and not that it came to have these qualities and this value because it was made a legal tender.