It is no doubt quite natural that the Government and people of Spain should feel regret at the permanent occupation of Gibraltar by a foreign power; and it has been suggested that we should accept in exchange the town and fortress of Ceuta, which holds a somewhat analogous position on the other side of the Straits and which belongs to Spain, and thus remove any cause for unfriendly feeling on their part. The question, however, is not so simple as at first sight it would appear. Assuming for the moment that the strategical value of Ceuta as a naval station equals that of Gibraltar, on which I offer no decided opinion, it is by no means certain that the proposal if made by us would be accepted. The Spanish Government are very tenacious of their possessions on the coast of Morocco, as giving them great influence in that country. Their apparent desire is to hold a powerful, if not a predominating, influence on both sides of the straits; and, although they would no doubt gladly obtain possession of Gibraltar, it does not therefore follow that they would give up possession of one of their most valuable positions on the opposite coast in exchange. Other Mediterranean powers also are carefully watching events in Morocco, and it is very possible they might not acquiesce in our occupation of Ceuta. These are diplomatic rather than military questions, and I only allude to them as proofs that the subject is rather involved and goes beyond a mere exchange of territory. So far as Morocco is concerned, its present condition is deplorable. It is a country situated only a few miles from Europe, with an excellent climate and great agricultural and mineral resources; inhabited, moreover, by a fine, brave race of people, and yet, notwithstanding these advantages, owing partly to the jealousies of its neighbours, its resources remain undeveloped, whilst its government is weak and cruel to a degree. In considering the two-fold aspect of Gibraltar as a fortress and a commercial city combined, it is sometimes argued that its dual interests are antagonistic, and that the presence of a large civil population would add to the difficulties of its defence. To a certain extent no doubt the position is anomalous, as in other fortified cities. Should hostilities occur, and should the fortress be seriously threatened, its trade would certainly suffer and a considerable proportion of the inhabitants would probably seek temporary refuge elsewhere. Still we must bear in mind that war is the exception; and as not a shot has been fired at Gibraltar for upwards of a century, it would appear senseless to paralyse its commercial advantages in time of peace in anticipation of what an enemy might attempt to accomplish in war. In short, the remedy would be far worse than the disease.