But there is a still more important aspect of the case than the personal one. It is a great injury to the public service that a Commander-in-Chief in the field, surrounded, as he must be, by constant difficulties and anxieties, should be thus misjudged by violent and erroneous statements, and be attacked behind his back at a time when from absence, want of leisure, and from the nature of his position he is unable to reply. I must add that in almost every campaign in which I have borne a part, the same tendency to hasty criticism has been more or less observable, and always at moments when the people at home, being naturally anxious, are all the more susceptible and easily misled. The death of Lord Raglan tended, no doubt, to diminish the influence of England in the councils of the war at a critical period of the campaign, and the _entente cordiale_ between the generals of the allied armies which his influence and high character had done so much to maintain, gradually weakened. It was in every sense a calamity. The appointment, however, of General Simpson as his successor at all events prevented any divergence of opinion as regarded the immediate operations against Sebastopol. General Pélissier and himself were in entire accord that the Malakoff was the dominant feature of the situation; and although other parts of the enceinte, such as the Great and Little Redans and the Bastion du Mât, could not be left out of account, still in the final assault the attacks on these points would not necessarily lead to the fall of the place, and would, therefore, be subsidiary diversions, as it were, to the capture of the central position. In one of his first despatches General Simpson said that 'we were repairing and improving our works, to be in readiness to co-operate with the French, when their approaches towards the Malakoff shall be completed.' The opinion given at the beginning of the siege by Sir John Burgoyne, that 'the great tower was the key of the whole position,' had at length become the axiom of all.[41] FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 39: See Lord Raglan's despatch, June 19, 1855. Also Kinglake, viii. 161.] [Footnote 40: Afterwards Field Marshal Lord Strathnairn.] [Footnote 41: General Pélissier, in his despatch of September 11 on the fall of Sebastopol, specially says that the Malakoff was the key of the defences, and that the other attacks were subordinate.] CHAPTER XI. BATTLE OF CHERNAYA AND THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL. During the month of July and the early part of August the allies were occupied in pushing on their trenches, in obtaining fresh armaments and munitions, and adding to their batteries. About this time I was present at several interesting councils connected with these preparations, and partly with the consideration of suggestions from home. In my journal is a record as follows:--