The second great revolution was necessitated by the alteration in the centre of international gravity occasioned by the growth of the German Navy. Formerly the Mediterranean Fleet ranked first in importance. Now the Home Fleet concentrates in its four divisions all the best fighting ships we possess. It is hardly too much to say, as M. Hanotaux publicly declared, that Admiral Fisher had, by concentration and redistribution, magnified our fighting naval strength by an amount unparalleled in a hundred years. That the fighting efficiency of the Fleet has been doubled under Fisher’s _régime_ is to understate the facts. To say it has been trebled would hardly be over the mark. And what is the most marvellous thing of all is that this enormous increase of efficiency was achieved not only without any increase of the estimates, but in spite of a reduction which amounted to nearly five millions sterling--three and a half millions actual and one and a half millions automatic increase checked. This great economy was largely achieved by the scrapping of ships too weak to fight and too slow to run away. One hundred and fifty obsolete and useless ships were removed from the effective list; some were sold, others were broken up, while a third class were kept in store for contingencies. They were lame ducks, all useless in war, costly in peace, consuming stores, wasting the time of officers and men. The obsolete ships were replaced on foreign stations by vessels which could either fight or fly.... Of the introduction of the “Dreadnought” and super-“Dreadnoughts” I have already spoken. Apart from the above matters of high policy, a number of other reforms or advances have been made during the past five years which are beyond all criticism. Opinions may differ as to the details of some of these services, but there is no dispute as to their immense contribution to the fighting efficiency of the Navy. Some of these may be thus briefly enumerated: 1. Complete reorganisation of the dockyards. [6,000 redundant workmen discharged.] 2. Improved system of refits of ships, and limitation of number of vessels absent at one time from any fleet for repair. 3. Introduction of the Royal Fleet Reserve, composed only of ratings who have served for a period of years in the active service. 4. Improvements of Royal Naval Reserve, by enforcing periodical training on board modern commissioned ships in place of obsolete hulks or shore batteries. 5. Establishment and extension of Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. 6. The establishment of a service of offensive mines and mine-laying vessels. 7. The introduction of vessels for defensive mine-sweeping in harbours and on the open sea. 8. A complete organisation of the service of auxiliary vessels for the fleets in war. 9. The development of submarines, and the equipment of submarine bases and all the necessary auxiliaries. 10. The proper organisation of the Destroyer Flotillas, with their essential auxiliaries.