Here we have to go back to first principles. It has become too much the fashion to employ the phrase “a two-Power standard” as a mere shibboleth. The principle this phrase embodies has been of the utmost value in the past, and is likely to be so in the future; but if used unintelligently at the present moment it merely gives the enemy cause to blaspheme. Great Britain must, it is agreed, maintain at all costs the command of the sea. Therefore we must be decisively stronger than any possible enemy. Who then is the possible enemy? Ten years ago, or even less, we should probably have answered, France and Russia in alliance. As they were then respectively the second and third naval Powers, the two-Power standard had an actuality which it has since lost. The United States and Germany are competing for the second place which France has already almost yielded. Russia’s fleet has practically disappeared. Japan’s has sprung to the front rank. Of the four Powers which are primarily in question, Japan is our ally, France is our close friend, America is a kindred State with whom we may indeed have evanescent quarrels, but with whom, it is scarcely too much to say, we shall never have a parricidal war. The other considerable naval Powers are Italy and Austria, of whom we are the secular friends, and whose treaty obligations are in the highest degree unlikely to force them into a rupture with us which could in no possible way serve their own interests. There remains Germany. Undoubtedly she is a possible enemy.[4] While there is no specific cause of dispute there is a general commercial and--on the German side--political rivalry which has unfortunately but indisputably caused bad blood between the two countries. For the moment, it would be safe to build against Germany only. But we cannot build for the moment: the Board of Admiralty are the trustees of future generations of their countrymen, who may not enjoy the same comparatively serene sky as ourselves. The ships we lay down this year may have their influence on the international situation twenty years hence, when Germany--or whoever our most likely antagonist may then be--may have the opportunity of the co-operation (even if only temporary) of another great naval Power. Hence a two-Power standard, rationally interpreted, is by no means out of date. But it is not a rational interpretation to say that we must instantly lay down as many ships as any other two Powers are at this moment laying down. We must take long views; we must be sure what other Powers are doing; we must take the average of their efforts, and average our own efforts in response.