Now this matter of averaging the shipbuilding, of equalising the programme over a number of years, deserves further consideration. Some Powers, notably Germany, attempt to achieve this end by creating long statutory programmes. The British Admiralty has abandoned the idea since the Naval Defence Act. For us, in fact, it would be a thoroughly vicious system. For a Power which is trying to “set the pace,” and which is glad to avoid annual discussion of the financial aspect of the question, it, no doubt, has its advantages. But Great Britain does not build to a naval strength that can be determined _a priori_; she builds simply and solely to maintain the command of the sea against other Powers. For this end the Admiralty must have its hands free to determine from year to year what the shipbuilding requirements are. But, again, this does not mean that our efforts must be spasmodic, that because foreign Powers lay down six ships one year and none the next, therefore we must do the same. For administrative reasons, which should be obvious, and which in any case this is not the place to dilate upon, it is very necessary that shipbuilding should approximate year by year, so far as practicable, to some normal figure, and that increases or decreases, when they become necessary, should be made gradually. This double principle, of determining the programme from year to year, and yet averaging the number of ships built over a number of years, has to be firmly grasped by anyone who desires to understand the Admiralty shipbuilding policy. With this preamble we are in a position to discuss the actual situation. And first we have to consider what is the existing relative strength of Great Britain and the other naval Powers. About this there is really no difference of opinion--British naval supremacy was never better assured than at the present moment. Even admitting the combination of two of the three next naval Powers (France, Germany, and the United States) to be conceivable, it is certain that any two of them would hesitate to attack us, and it is more than probable that if they did they would be defeated, even without the assistance of our Japanese allies. The alleged alarm as to our naval strength is therefore admittedly in regard to the future, not in regard to the present. And here (to digress for a moment) we may remark that agitations have occurred in earlier years when it was supposed that some foreign Power or combination of Powers was actually in a position to sweep us off the Channel, but never before have we been invited to panic by prophecy. Is there not something slightly absurd in alarm--not calculation, for that is justifiable enough, but alarm--about our position in 1920? At any rate, it is clear that it is the future which we are called on to consider.