“It might be thought that the withdrawal of the small non-effective vessels and the grouping of fleets and squadrons at the strategic positions for war involved the loss of British prestige, and of the ‘Showing the Flag’ (as it was termed). But the actual fact is that never before in naval history has there been a more universal display of sea power than during this year by this country. The Channel Fleet in the North Sea and Baltic receiving the courtesies of Holland, Denmark, and Germany; the Atlantic Fleet at Brest; the Mediterranean Fleet at Algiers; the Fourth Cruiser Squadron, consisting of five powerful fighting vessels, now in the West Atlantic; a powerful squadron of six of the finest armoured cruisers in the world visiting Lisbon, Canada, Newfoundland, and United States; a squadron of cruisers, under a Commodore, proceeding from Labrador to Cape Horn and back by the coast of Africa, and two cruisers visiting the Pacific Coast and the adjacent islands; the movements of the Cape Squadron and of the Eastern Fleet in China, Australia, and the Indian Ocean: so imposing and ubiquitous a display of the flag and of naval power has never before been attained by our own Navy.” The statement goes on to explain the special circumstances--use in shallow inland waters, etc., etc., which alone are held by the Admiralty to justify the use of gunboats. This policy is from time to time impugned by people who have no need to count the cost of the alternative policy. Doubtless it would be convenient, as a temporary emergency arises here or there over the surface of the globe, if at that very spot some British cruiser or gunboat promptly appeared ready to protect British interests, or to sink in the attempt. Indeed, for some time this was the ideal at which the Admiralty aimed. But since the redistribution of the Fleet the Empire has had to do without the ubiquitous gunboat, and, if the truth be told, scarcely seems to have missed it. There are one or two valuable cases in point. For a long time the Foreign Office, or rather the Ambassador at Constantinople, pressed for the restoration of the second stationnaire. The Admiralty sternly refused. The only noticeable result of this dangerous policy so far has been that the French have followed our example and withdrawn their second vessel. An even more remarkable case occurred in Uruguay. A poaching Canadian sealer had been captured by the Uruguayan authorities, and language was used as if the disruption of the Empire would follow a refusal on the part of the Admiralty to liberate her crew by force. For a time the Admiralty was practically in revolt against H.M. Government, and then--everything blew over. The dispute was settled by diplomatic action and the local courts of law.