The question of the small vessel for police duties will long be with us. Vice-Consuls and Resident Commissioners will, no doubt, continue to act on the great principle: When in doubt wire for a gunboat. The Foreign and Colonial Offices, to whom the dispatch of a gunboat means no more than persuading a gentleman in Whitehall to send a telegram saying she is to go, will probably never quite realise why the gentleman should be so perverse as to refuse. But the matter is really now a “chose jugée”; the Admiralty battle has been fought and won, and it only remains for the Admiralty to adhere to its principles and decline to give way simply for the sake of a quiet life. COAST GUARD _June, 1906._ The Coast Guard Service was transferred from the control of the Commissioners of Customs to that of the Admiralty by the Coast Guard Service Act, 1856, in order to make better provision for-- (i) The defence of the coasts of the realm; (ii) The more ready manning of His Majesty’s Navy in case of war or sudden emergency; (iii) The protection of the Revenue; and there is little doubt that at that time the Coast Guard force was required for these three purposes. Since that date, however, these requirements have been greatly modified by the great developments that have taken place in steam, in electricity, and generally in the conduct of Naval warfare, and also as regards the inducements and facilities for smuggling. It is now considered that about 170 War Signal and Wireless Telegraphy Stations in the United Kingdom are sufficient to give warning of the approach of an enemy’s ships, and that, as far as the use of the Coast Guard for Coast Defence is concerned, the remaining 530 Stations and their personnel are quite unnecessary. _As an Active Service force the Coast Guard is far from fulfilling modern fighting requirements, which are so exacting that a man’s efficiency depends upon his being_ continuously _associated with highly technical duties on board ship, and employment in the Coast Guard_ (_even with the arranged periodical training in the Fleet_) _is found to be inconsistent with these requirements._ Again, as a Reserve, though it fulfils the requirements of such a force, yet its cost (largely due to the heavy expense of housing the men and their families) is out of all proportion to that at which the efficient Royal Fleet Reserve can now be maintained.