I. Whoever desires an effect | desires the cause of that effect -------------------------------+--------------------------------- Everyone desires the happiness | _everyone desires virtue_ which is caused by virtue | The case is manifestly untrue. *** 'He who has a confirmed habit of any kind of action exercises no self-denial in the practice of that action; a good man has a confirmed habit of virtue; therefore he who exercises self-denial in the practice of virtue is not a good man.'--(Arist. _Eth._ Bk. II., from Whately.) VI. I. He who has a | exercises no || He who exercises no | is good habit, &c. | self-denial || self-denial in the | | || practice of virtue | ------------------+--------------------++---------------------+-------- A good man has | _He exercises no || He who _does_ | _N. C._ this habit with | self-denial with || exercise &c. | respect to virtue | respect to virtue_ || | The conclusion drawn is fallacious, the second theorem being based on contrast. *** 'According to theologians, a man must possess faith to be acceptable to the Deity; now he who believes all the fables of heathen mythology must possess faith; therefore such a one must, according to theologians, be acceptable to the Deity.' 'Faith' is ambiguous, meaning in the precedent, spiritual aspiration, and in the case ignorant credulity. *** 'No evil should be allowed that good may come of it; all punishment is an evil; therefore no punishment should be allowed that good may come of it.'--'Evil' is ambiguous, meaning wrong-doing in the precedent and pain in the case; the conclusion is therefore fallacious. *** 'The principles of justice are variable; the appointments of nature are invariable; therefore the principles of justice are no appointments of nature.'--(Arist. _Eth._ Bk. V., from Whately.) The terms 'principles of justice' and 'nature' require to be defined. It might be said that justice is one principle, everywhere and always the same, and that only its embodiments in law and custom are variable. *** 'What happens every day is not improbable; some things, against which the chances are many thousands to one, happen every day; therefore some things against which the chances are many thousands to one, are not improbable.'--A fallacy of division: that improbable things in general happen every day does not render the occurrence of any one a probable event. *** 'Protection from punishment is plainly due to the innocent; therefore, as you maintain that this person ought not to be punished, it appears that you are convinced of his innocence.'--A fallacy of cross reasoning.