'Something has existed from eternity. For since something now is, it is manifest that something always was. Otherwise the things that now are must have risen out of nothing, absolutely and without cause. Which is a plain contradiction in terms. For to say a thing is produced, and yet that there is no cause at all of that production, is to say that something is effected when it is effected by nothing, that is, at the same time when it is not effected at all. Whatever exists has a cause of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature, and then it must have been of itself eternal: or in the will of some other being, and then that other being must, at least in the order of nature and causality, have existed before it.' In this theorem we have a case--'Something is'; and a conclusion--'Something has existed from eternity.' The reasoner seeks a credible or conceivable precedent by which to connect that conclusion with the case. We are offered a choice of two theorems. The first is untenable, for we have never had the experience that is given as precedent; it is also tautological, as the 'something' of the case is the 'whatever' of the precedent. V. Whatever exists in the necessity | has existed from eternity of its own nature | ------------------------------------+------------------------------- 'Something' exists in the necessity | _it has existed from eternity_ of its own nature It is not inconceivable that something should be self-existent, but we know nothing as to its being eternal. We are not familiar enough with self-existent things and eternal things to warrant us in asserting dogmatically that where the first quality is, there also must be the second. The next theorem is that everything must be caused, and that causation involves a _regressum ad infinitum_. On this principle there must have been things for an eternity backwards. According to the theory of causation given in section XXVII, a true beginning is reached when we discover the motive, design and power that produced an effect. It is not necessary to ask next what caused that motive, design and power. The infinite regress is applicable only to _material sequence_, in which there is no proper beginning or end. The author of the above argument seems to be trying to combine the notion of causation by _will_ with that of infinite regress. But his language is too obscure to make it certain what he means exactly. *** The three following theorems--in a diluted form--occur in an otherwise excellent work on the politics and social life of the ancient Greeks.