Both these conclusions are inadmissible. It is because they are empirically true that we are apt to think their truth depends on the antecedent information. If we wish to extend the qualities of Socrates to 'some men' we must make them a case with 'Socrates is poor and wise' for a precedent, but I fail to see how it is to be done. If we add to the premises, 'One man was Socrates, therefore one man was poor and wise,' we have a tautological fallacy. J. S. Mill notices a fallacy which amounts to an _Inversion_ of the Parallel: the conclusion is known or believed and the truth of the antecedents is inferred backwards. 'People continually think and express themselves as if they believed that the premises cannot be false if the conclusion is true. The truth, or supposed truth, of the inferences which follow from a doctrine, often enables it to find acceptance in spite of gross absurdities in it. How many philosophical systems which had scarcely any intrinsic recommendation have been received by thoughtful men because they were supposed to lend additional support to religion, morality, some favourite view of politics, or some other cherished persuasion; not merely because their wishes were thereby enlisted on its side, but because its leading to what they deemed sound conclusions appeared to them a strong presumption in favour of its truth, though the presumption, when viewed in its true light, amounted only to the absence of that particular evidence of falsehood which would have resulted from its leading by correct inference to something already known to be false.'[19] The conclusion of an argument may sometimes be left unexpressed. If the antecedents are strong and the conclusion obvious it weakens the argument to state the conclusion in full, besides reflecting on the capacity of the reader or hearer to draw the conclusion for himself. Hence we find at the end of controversial and indignant writings such expressions as--'Comment is superfluous'--'We leave the reader to draw his own conclusions,'--or simply a point of exclamation is appended. Sophistical insinuations are suggested in this manner. A train of ideas is laid that generates a conclusion which the speaker is afraid or ashamed to put into words. The second fault of the syllogism as defined may be called the fallacy of _No Application_. It consists in arranging propositions so as to end in a classification, but no applicate is detached and no rational conclusion is drawn. 'Jones is a Welshman; all Welshmen are Britons; therefore Jones is a Briton.' If in actual thinking it were ever desired to establish by argument that Jones is a Briton, it would be with the object of applying to him some quality connoted by Briton, but the presence of which in Jones is a matter of doubt. This would be a conclusion--but not the mere classification.