Religion and Science from Galileo to BergsonHardwick, J. C. (John Charlton)
Religion
Religion and Science from Galileo to Bergson
Hardwick, J. C. (John Charlton)
Religion and science
Systematised knowledge may thus conceivably come into conflict with the
presuppositions or the ideals of some particular religion. It is then
that a "religious problem" arises. A religion indissolubly associated
with a geocentric conception of the universe would tend to become
discredited as soon as that conception had been disposed of by
"systematic knowledge." Science may even tend to produce an attitude to
life hostile not only to a particular religion but to _all_ religion. If
materialism should ultimately be found to be consistent with systematic
and accurate knowledge, it is difficult to see how any attitude to life
which could be appropriately described as "religion" could survive. The
religious problem would then, at any rate, cease to trouble us. The
religious apologists would be free to turn their attention to matters of
more moment. But it is not only with the cessation of religion that the
religious problem slumbers. There are certain happy periods when
religion flourishes undisturbed by obstinate questionings. These
classical ages of religion exist when systematised knowledge seems to
support the contemporary religious outlook--when science and religion
speak with one voice. Such unanimity seems to us to-day too good to be
possible, but that is only because our own age is exceptional--not
because those happier ages were exceptional; they, in fact--if we trace
history backwards--would seem rather to have been the rule.
Primitive man, it would seem, was troubled by no discords of the kind
which disturb our peace. His systematic knowledge--such as it was--was
entirely in accord with his religion, the two were, in fact, in his case
practically one. His science _was_ his religion. It may not have been
very sound science, nor very elevated religion, but it served his
purpose admirably. He was too busy with the struggle for survival to
indulge in speculation. His religion was severely practical, and he was
faithful to it because experience seemed to indicate that it paid.
But the Stone Age hardly deserves (in spite of its freedom from
religious difficulties) to be described as one of the classical ages of
religion; absence of struggle does not necessarily mean richness of
life. There are ages which better deserve that appellation. There are
times when all existing culture--even of a high level--is closely
associated with the current religion, endorses its ideals, sanctions its
hopes, puts the stamp of finality upon its faith. Such an age cannot
perhaps hope to be permanent; for life means movement, and movement
upsets equilibrium, and human knowledge tends to increase faster than
the human mind can adapt itself to it or digest it. But such ages are
looked back upon with regret when they are past, they shed a golden
radiance over history, their tradition lingers, they even leave behind
them monuments of art and literature which are the wonder, and the
inimitable models, of succeeding generations.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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