The same remark will hold good towards America. The import of gold thence in 1849 and 1850 could not have done more than replace the gold coin exported to the United States two years earlier, in payment of bread stuffs and salt provisions. A proof of this will be found by examining the official reports of the mints of the United States. These mints, which from the year 1834--that is, since the working of the gold fields of Carolina, had coined gold at the average rate of 2,500,000 dollars ([24]13,500,000 francs) per annum, in 1847 put into circulation about 20,000,000 dollars ([25]104,000,000 francs). At that time Californian gold was unknown: the rich “_placers_” of that country did not begin to kindle the gold fever, first in America, and subsequently in Europe, until 1848. Californian gold, before it found its way to the Old World, had to supply the wants of the New. It is exported thence in the shape of eagles and double eagles, bearing the stamp of the Republic. In 1848 the coined gold in the United States did not amount to [26]4,000,000 dollars, and it did not exceed [27]9,000,000 in 1849. With this small supply an export could not be expected. In 1850 the Californian stream began to flow, and the mint of the United States, having received gold dust and bars to the extent of [28]40,000,000 dollars, coined [29]32,000,000 (about 171,000,000 francs.) Supposing that the bulk of this coin had been exported to Europe, such a supply would but have restored the loss in the circulating medium which had occurred in 1846. We had exchanged our gold against grain; it was returned to us against the silks, wines, and other articles from France. The monetary disturbance of 1850 must not therefore be set down to the score of an excess of imports: the rich supplies from Siberia and California could then only have acted prospectively. The real cause is to be found in the measures hastily and somewhat rashly adopted by various European governments. To prevent future evil they created immediate mischief; and, in order to shelter themselves from the risk of a future depreciation of gold, they directly produced it. The crisis of 1850, thus examined, explains itself. On the one hand, silver, being annually taken out of the market by circulation, was not to be met with for other demands; on the other hand, gold, excluded by some governments from their circulation, flowed to those countries where it was still used as legal coin, and produced there, at least, a temporary superabundance. Then occurred the fall in the price of gold, and the rise in the price of silver; which together shewed a divergence of 8 per cent. between their former relative prices.