information shows that it is ready for action, and certainly equal to its opponent.... It is much to be regretted that Servia can take no part in the war; it is only with the greatest exertion that a corps of 15,000 men can be assembled, and they would assuredly show no enthusiasm." [20] All words in italics are written in ciphered French in the original. _From_ PRINCE CHARLES ANTHONY, _January 22nd, 1877_. "On looking back over recent events the conviction is borne in upon me that the fear which the Russian Colossus inspires in Europe, coupled with the natural differences in the interests of the Powers, have been the causes of the pitiful end of the Congresses which started with such a flourish of trumpets. Had Europe been united and less timorous, it might have intervened and begun those Conferences at the time of the Servian War, instead of a whole year later. Turkey could hardly have resisted if a pressure of all the Powers had been applied at that time even without Russia, and she would have conceded more than she can now afford to do after her unquestionable successes in the Servian War and the complete change in her interior economy. So much is certain after a long and anxious period that the Conferences have resulted in a fiasco, and that this fiasco has materially raised and strengthened the _morale_ and authority of the Porte.... Roumania will be most deeply affected by such a war, as the Russian base of operations can only be Roumania; there is no other at her disposal. Resistance to Russia is out of the question; you must therefore endeavour to reap the greatest possible benefits from this impossibility. The material advantages develop spontaneously, for the acquisition of money and the increased value of all country produce will assume enormous dimensions; the political benefits are, however, more difficult to formulate. The permission to march through Roumanian territory, and the establishment there of all that an army on an active footing requires, is already half a declaration of war from Roumania to Turkey. The latter, however, must recognise that Roumania cannot prevent the entry of two or three hundred thousand Russians; the only question that remains is whether Roumania will co-operate with the advance of the Russian army and cross the Danube. I should consider this most unwise, for in doing so Roumania will place herself between two stools. If the Turks preserve their proverbial powers of resistance, and so protract the war to an indefinite and costly length, we have no guarantee that the Russians would not conclude peace with the Turks in one way or another and abandon Roumania, who would then be overwhelmed by Turkish malevolence.