As it is usually the case in such occurrences, some innocent persons were killed and others injured, but for this the soldiers were not to blame. Being where they ought not to be, their presence whether so intended or not encouraged the mob, and the soldiers could not in such a crowd distinguish friend from foe. Spectators ought to keep away from such mobs at all times and not let their curiosity get the better of their judgment and discretion. It has been questioned whether it was a wise movement to order General Brinton's command into the round-house and shops on the evening of the 21st. The move itself we do not care to criticise, but having been made, we think a stronger picket guard should have been thrown out, all approaches more thoroughly guarded, communication kept up with the Union depot, where the supplies of ammunition and food were stored, and whenever the mob began to assemble in the neighborhood a sufficient force should have been ordered out to disperse them, which could have been done with the means at General Brinton's command. The great mistake was made by General Pearson in ordering General Brinton not to allow his men to fire on the mob when they began to re-assemble, and showed their murderous disposition by firing on the troops, and the other measures taken by them in the early evening. General Brinton asked for leave to fire on the mob when they began to assemble around the round house and fire on his men, but General Pearson would not allow it. It was of no use to march out for the purpose of dispersing such a mob unless the men were allowed to fire, if necessary, as blood had been shed, the mob had become enraged by this and emboldened by the position and apparent inactivity of the troops, and nothing but the most severe measures would now be sufficient to overawe and disperse them. General Pearson was evidently intimidated by the denunciation which he received, at the hands of the press and people of Pittsburgh, as the supposed author of the order to fire on the mob at Twenty-eighth street. In his evidence he states that if he had given the command to fire at Twenty-eighth street, and it had not been followed by the frightful destruction of property which ensued, he would have been tried, convicted, and hung for murder, such was the sentiment of the people of Pittsburgh at that time. We think he should have taken vigorous measures against the mob after the occurrences at Twenty-eighth street, and not have allowed it to assemble again in that vicinity, and that he ought not to have left the round house at the time he did. For what occurred after that time he is blameless, for on reaching the Union Depot Hotel he was practically relieved from his command by General Latta. We think this was a mistake also; that it was giving way to the sentiment still prevailing in Pittsburgh that the attempt to disperse the mob at Twenty-eighth street was wrong, and the killing of the persons at that place nothing less than murder.