By this same writer it is also said: "The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority; they _equally_ participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As society cannot perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their parents, and succeed to all their rights." Again: "I say, to be _of the country_, it is necessary to be born of a person who is a _citizen_; for if he be born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his _birth_, and not his _country_. The inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens, are foreigners who are permitted to settle and stay in the country." (Vattel, Book 1, cap. 19, p. 101.) From the views here expressed, and they seem to be unexceptionable, it must follow, that with the _slave_, with one devoid of rights or capacities, _civil or political_, there could be no pact; that one thus situated could be no party to, or actor in, the association of those possessing free will, power, discretion. He could form no part of the design, no constituent ingredient or portion of a society based upon _common_, that is, upon _equal_ interests and powers. He could not at the same time be the sovereign and the slave. But it has been insisted, in argument, that the emancipation of a slave, effected either by the direct act and assent of the master, or by causes operating in contravention of his will, produces a change in the _status_ or capacities of the slave, such as will transform him from a mere subject of property, into a being possessing a social, civil, and political equality with a citizen. In other words, will make him a citizen of the State within which he was, previously to his emancipation, a slave. It is difficult to conceive by what magic the mere _surcease_ or renunciation of an interest in a subject of _property_, by an individual possessing that interest, can alter the essential character of that property with respect to persons or communities unconnected with such renunciation. Can it be pretended that an individual in any State, by his single act, though voluntarily or designedly performed, yet without the co-operation or warrant of the Government, perhaps in opposition to its policy or its guaranties, can create a citizen of that State? Much more emphatically may it be asked, how such a result could be accomplished by means wholly extraneous, and entirely foreign to the Government of the State? The argument thus urged must lead to these extraordinary conclusions. It is regarded at once as wholly untenable, and as unsustained by the direct authority or by the analogies of history.