=170.= In the approximation between Stoicism and the Academy which characterizes the first century B.C., the Stoic logic obtained in the end the upper hand; and the logic of the so-called ‘old Academy’ founded by Antiochus is in all essentials that of the Stoics. Nevertheless the objections urged against it by Cicero represent not only his reason but also his sentiments. The positive system appears at its best in the education of children; and even at the present day the theory of knowledge which is tacitly adopted in schools is substantially that of the Stoics. It leads to careful observation, earnest inquiry, and resolute choice; and thus lays the foundation of solidity of character. But it must be admitted that it also works in the direction of a certain roughness and harshness of disposition. Not only is the Stoically-minded man lacking in sympathy for beliefs different from his own, which he is bound to regard as both foolish and wicked; but he is also blind to that whole side of the universe which cannot be reduced to syllogistic shape. Thus we may account for the indifference or hostility with which most Stoics regarded both literature and art[148]. The Academic, on the other hand, even if he lacked moral firmness and saw too clearly both sides of every question, was saved by his critical powers from extreme assertions and harsh personal judgments, and had a delicate appreciation of the finer shadings of life. Thus behind the formal differences of the two schools there lies a difference of character. We have long since learnt that the fundamental questions between the two schools are incapable of solution by the human mind, and we can therefore appreciate the one without condemning the other. In practical life each theory has its appropriate sphere; but the Romans were hardly in the wrong when in matters of doubt they leaned towards the Stoic side. FOOTNOTES [1] ‘[veteres illi Platonis auditores] totam philosophiam tres in partes diviserunt; quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus’ Cic. _Fin._ iv 2, 4. [2] Sext. _math._ vii 16 (Arnim ii 38). [3] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἄντικρυς μέρος αὐτὴν ἀπεφαίνοντο Philopon. _ad Anal._ pr. f. 4a; Stein, _Psychologie_ ii 93. See also Arnim ii 49 and 49a. [4] Epict. _Disc._ i 17, 6. [5] Diog. L. vii 40. [6] ἀρέσκει οὖν [τοῖς Κυνικοῖς] τὸν λογικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν ... καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι Diog. L. vi 103 and 105. [7] τίς οὖν ὕλη τοῦ φιλοσόφου; μὴ τρίβων; οὔ, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγος· τί τέλος; μή τι φορεῖν τρίβωνα; οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχειν τὸν λόγον Epict. _Disc._ iv 8, 12. [8] ‘Stoici ... cum vehementer amaverint artem disputandi’ Aug. _Civ. De._ viii 7. [9] Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 66. [10] See below, §§ 164, 165. [11] ‘hi, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi ... totam vitam evertunt funditus’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 10, 31. [12] See above, § 93. [13] Epict. _Disc._ ii 11, 13. [14] ‘Stoici deum visum vocantes, quod optimum putabant’ Chalc. _in Tim._ 266 (Arnim ii 863). [15] Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 19.