Rough Ways Made Smooth: A series of familiar essays on scientific subjectsProctor, Richard A. (Richard Anthony)
Science
Rough Ways Made Smooth: A series of familiar essays on scientific subjects
Proctor, Richard A. (Richard Anthony)
Science
Rather more than two years ago I considered in the pages of 'Science
Byways' the theory originally propounded by Sir Henry Holland, but
then recently advocated by Dr. Brown-Sequard, of New York, that we
have two brains, each perfectly sufficient for the full performance
of mental functions. I did not for my own part either advocate or
oppose that theory, but simply considered the facts which had been
urged in support of it, or which then occurred to me as bearing upon
it, whether for or against. I showed, however, that some classes of
phenomena which had been quoted in support of the theory seemed in
reality opposed to it, when all the circumstances were considered. For
example, Brown-Sequard had referred to some of those well-known cases
in which during severe illness a language forgotten in the patient's
ordinary condition had been recalled, the recollection of the language
enduring only while the illness lasted. I pointed to a case in which
there had not been two mental conditions only, as indicated by the
language of the patient, but three; the person in question having in
the beginning of his illness spoken English only, in the middle of his
illness French only, and on the day of his death Italian only (the
language of his childhood). The interpretation of that case, and of
others of a similar kind, must, I remarked, be very different from that
which Brown-Sequard assigned, perhaps correctly, 'to cases of twofold
mental life.' A case of the last-named kind has recently been discussed
in scientific circles, which seems to me to bear very forcibly on the
question whether Holland's theory of a dual brain is correct. I propose
briefly to describe and examine this case, and some others belonging to
the same class, two of which were touched upon in my former essay, but
slightly only, as forming but a small part of the evidence dealt with
by Brown-Sequard, whose arguments I was then considering. I wish now to
deal, not with the question of the duality of the brain, but with the
more general question of dual or intermittent consciousness.
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