ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1777 BURGOYNE MOVED FROM HIS CAMP NEAR THE SWORD HOUSE IN THREE DIVISIONS. RIEDESEL MOVED FORWARD ON THE RIVER ROAD. BURGOYNE COMMANDED THE CENTER. FRASER MOVED THROUGH THE WOODS ON THE RIGHT. AT MIDDAY BURGOYNE’S TROOPS ACCIDENTALLY ENCOUNTERED SOME OF MORGAN’S MEN NEAR FREEMAN’S FARM, ABOUT ONE MILE NORTH OF THIS POINT. A SAVAGE BATTLE ENSUED. REINFORCEMENTS WERE THROWN IN BY BOTH SIDES. THE FREEMAN FARM CLEARING WAS REPEATEDLY WON AND LOST BY THE OPPOSING FORCES UNTIL NIGHTFALL. RIEDESEL’S TIMELY ARRIVAL FROM THE RIVER SAVED BURGOYNE FROM TOTAL DEFEAT. THE AMERICANS WITHDREW INTO THEIR CAMP, WHERE YOU NOW STAND, LEAVING BURGOYNE MASTER OF THE FIELD. [Illustration: _Col. Daniel Morgan._] [Illustration: _Brig. Gen. Benedict Arnold._ Courtesy Fort Ticonderoga Museum.] Accordingly, on the morning of September 19, Burgoyne moved forward in three columns from his encampment in the vicinity of the Sword House. The right column under Fraser, numbering 2,830 men composed of British and German grenadiers and light infantry, together with the British 24th regiment and the irregulars, advanced along the road running westward from the Sword House to a point 3 miles distant where it then turned south. The center column, consisting of the British 9th, 20th, 21st, and 62nd regiments, was led by Burgoyne. This force, which numbered approximately 1,840 men, followed the route of Fraser for a short distance and then turned southeast at the first fork which led to the Great Ravine. Crossing the ravine, the column then turned westward in an effort to take a position parallel in line with Fraser’s column. The left column of about 3,160 men under General Riedesel, consisting of six companies of the British 47th regiment and the German regiments of Riedesel, Rhetz, Specht, and Hesse Hanau, was to advance along the river road accompanied by the heavy artillery, the baggage train, and bateaux. They were to await the signal gun which would indicate that the right and center columns under Fraser and Burgoyne had reached the proper positions. Then, all three columns were to begin advancing toward the American camp until a strong position could be found close enough to it to serve as a base for further operations. American scouts from the east side of the Hudson detected the forward movement of Riedesel’s column along the river road. When Gates was first advised by his scouts of the British advance, he determined to await their attack behind his breastwork. Arnold, however, insisted that the issue should be fought in the field. He reasoned that the forest would not only handicap the British from the standpoint of coordinated attack and the full use of their artillery, but it would also offer a screen peculiarly adaptable to the American style of fighting. If defeated in the field, he argued, the troops could then fall back to their entrenchments.