The Ideas, as we have seen, constitute the determinate stages of
objectivation of the Will. The innumerable individuals of which the
Ideas are the patterns are subject to the law of sufficient reason. They
appear, that is to say, under the forms of time, space, and causality.
The Idea is beyond these forms, and therefore is clear of plurality and
change. Since the law of sufficient reason is the common form under
which stands all the subject's knowledge so far as the subject knows as
individual, the Ideas lie outside the sphere of knowledge of the
individual as such. If, therefore, the Ideas are to be the object of
knowledge, this can only be by annulling individuality in the knowing
subject.
As thing-in-itself, the Will is exempt even from the first of the forms
of knowledge, the form of being 'object for a subject.' The Platonic
Idea, on the other hand, is necessarily an object, something known, a
presentation. It has laid aside, or rather has not taken on, the
subordinate forms; but it has retained the first and most general form.
It is the immediate and most adequate possible objectivity of the Will;
whereas particular things are an objectivation troubled by the forms of
which the law of sufficient reason is the common expression.
When intellect breaks loose from the service of the will, for which it
was originally destined in the teleology of nature, then the subject
ceases to be merely individual and becomes pure will-less subject of
knowledge. In this state the beholder no longer tracks out relations in
accordance with the principle of sufficient reason--which is the mode of
scientific as well as of common knowledge--but rests in fixed
contemplation of the given object apart from its connection with
anything else. The contemplator thus 'lost' in the object, it is not the
single thing as such that is known, but the Idea, the eternal form, the
immediate objectivity of the Will at this stage. The correlate of this
object--the pure Subject exempt from the principle of sufficient
reason--is eternal, like the Idea.
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