Notice that the pattern requires a duration involving a definite lapse of time, and not merely an instantaneous moment. Such a moment is more abstract, in that it merely denotes a certain relation of contiguity between the concrete events. Thus a duration is spatialised; and by ‘spatialised’ is meant that the duration is the field for the realised pattern constituting the character of the event. A duration, as the field of the pattern realised in the actualisation of one of its contained events, is an epoch, _i.e._, an arrest. Endurance is the repetition of the pattern in successive events. Thus endurance requires a succession of durations, each exhibiting the pattern. In this account ‘time’ has been separated from ‘extension’ and from the ‘divisibility’ which arises from the character of spatio-temporal extension’. Accordingly we must not proceed to conceive time as another form of extensiveness. Time is sheer succession of epochal durations. But the entities which succeed each other in this account are durations. The duration is that which is required for the realisation of a pattern in the given event. Thus the divisibility and extensiveness is within the given duration. The epochal duration is not realised _via_ its _successive_ divisible parts, but is given _with_ its parts. In this way, the objection which Zeno might make to the joint validity of two passages from Kant’s _Critique of Pure Reason_ is met by abandoning the earlier of the two passages. I refer to passages from the section ‘Of the Axioms of Intuition’; the earlier from the subsection on _Extensive Quantity_, and the latter from the subsection on _Intensive Quantity_ where considerations respecting quantity in general, extensive and intensive, are summed up. The earlier passage runs thus:[8] Footnote 8: Max Müller’s translation. “I call an extensive quantity that in which the representation of the whole is rendered possible by the representation of its parts, _and therefore necessarily preceded by it_.[9] I cannot represent to myself any line, however small it may be, without drawing it in thought, that is, without producing all its parts one after the other, starting from a given point, and thus, first of all, drawing its intuition. The same applies to every, even the smallest portion of time. I can only think in it the successive progress from one moment to another, thus producing in the end, by all the portions of time, and their addition, a definite quantity of time.” Footnote 9: Italics mine, and also in the second passage. The second passage runs thus: