A glance at the engraving will show the striking contrast between the existing service types as to armored surface. The Marceau appears absolutely naked by the side of the solidly armed citadel of the Nile. The contrast between the future types will be, of course, still more striking, for the reasons given in the last paragraph. But while remarking upon the paucity of heavy plating as exhibited in the service French battleships, we would say one word for the angle at which it is placed. The receding sides of the great vessels of France give two very important attributes in their favor. In the first place, a much broader platform at the water line is afforded to secure steadiness of the ship and stable equilibrium, and the angle at which the armor rests is so great as to present a very oblique surface to the impact of projectiles. The trajectory of modern rifled guns is so exceedingly flat that the angle of descent of the shot or shell is practically _nil_. Were the sides of the Royal Sovereign to fall back like those of the Marceau or Magenta, we seriously doubt whether any projectile, however pointed, would effect penetration at all. We conclude, then, that a comparison of the Marceau with the Nile as regards protective features is so incontestably in favor of the latter, that they cannot be classed together for a moment. In speed, moreover, though this is not a point under consideration, the Nile has the advantage. It is impossible, however, to avoid the conviction that the Dupuy de Lome would be a most powerful and disagreeable enemy for either of the eight great ironclads of Great Britain now building to encounter on service. The Hood and Royal Sovereign have many vulnerable points. At any position outside of the dark and light colored portions of armor plate indicated in our drawing, they could be hulled with impunity with the lightest weapons. It is true that gun detachments and ammunition will be secure within the internal "crinolines," but how about the other men and _materiel_ between decks? Now, the Dupuy de Lome may be riddled through and through bf a 131/2 in. shell if a Royal Sovereign ever succeeds in catching her; but from lighter weapons her between decks is almost secure. We cannot help feeling a sneaking admiration for the great French cruising battleship, with her 6,300 tons and 14,000 horse power, giving an easy speed of 20 knots in almost any weather, and protected by a complete 4 in. steel panoply, which will explode the shells of most of our secondary batteries on impact, or prevent their penetration. In fact, there is little doubt that the interior of the Trafalgar, whether as regards the secondary batteries or the unarmored ends, would be probably found to be a safer and pleasanter situation, in the event of action with a Dupuy de Lome, than either of the naked batteries or the upper works of the Royal Sovereign. This is what Sir E.J. Reed was so anxious to point out at the meeting of naval architects in 1889, when