2. Is a new shape of an article of manufacture, whereby utility is secured, a subject of protection under this act; and 3. Is mechanical function of any kind covered by it. As to the first of these questions, it seems to have been assumed that the design spoken of in all parts of the sections referred to covered a fixed, unchangeable figure, that the protection of letters patent did not extend to any variation, however slight, but that such variation constituted a new design, might be covered by a new patent, and might safely be used without infringement of the first. This, it is said, is the correct theory of the law, and has been the uniform adjudication of the Office. Neither of these statements is absolutely correct. The law by no means defines a design with such strictness. The language is, "new and original design for a manufacture," "new and original impression or ornament," "new and original shape or configuration." It would seem to be too plain for argument, that the new design, or impression, or shape, might be so generic in its character as to admit of many variations, which should embody the substantial characteristics and be entirely consistent with a substantial identity of form. Thus, if the invention were of a design for an ornamental button, the face of which was grooved with radial rays, it would seem that the first designer of such a button might properly describe a button of five rays, and, having stated that a greater number of rays might be used, might claim a design consisting generally of radial rays, or of "five or more" rays, and, that it could not be necessary for him to take out a patent for each additional ray that could be cut upon his button. So, if the design were the ornamentation of long combs by a chain of pearls, it would seem that a claim for such a design might be maintained against one who arranged the pearls, either in curved or straight lines, or who used half pearls only, and that such modifications if they had occurred to the designer, might properly have been enumerated in his specification as possible and equivalent variations. In short, I can see no reason, under the law, why designs may not be generic, why what are called "broad claims," may not be made to them, and why the doctrine of artistic or aesthetic equivalents may not be applied to them. This has been recognized to a greater or less extent in the adjudications of the courts and in the practice of the Office.