Secret armies : $b the new technique of Nazi warfareSpivak, John L. (John Louis)
History
Secret armies : $b the new technique of Nazi warfare
Spivak, John L. (John Louis)
Fascism; Propaganda, German; Secret service -- Germany
Eden, who had fought for sanctions against the aggressor when
Abyssinia was invaded, obeyed orders but insisted that Italy must
first get her soldiers out of Spain. He did not want Mussolini to get
a stranglehold upon Gibraltar, one of the strategic life lines of the
British Empire. Mussolini refused and told the British Ambassador in
Rome that he and Great Britain would never to able to get together
because Eden insisted on the withdrawal of Italian troops from Spain,
and that it might help if a different Foreign Secretary were
appointed. Hitler, working closely with Mussolini in the Rome-Berlin
axis, also began to press for a different Foreign Secretary but went
Mussolini one better. Von Ribbentrop informed Chamberlain that Der
Fuehrer was displeased with the English press attacks upon him, Nazis
and Nazi aggressions. Der Fuehrer wanted that stopped.
The Foreign Office of the once proud and still biggest empire in the
world promptly sent notes to the newspapers in Fleet Street
requesting that stories about Nazis and Hitler be toned down "to aid
the government," and most of the once proud and independent British
newspapers established a "voluntary censorship" at what amounted to an
order from Hitler relayed through England's Foreign Office. The
explanation the newspapers gave to their staffs was that the world
situation was too critical to refuse the government's request and,
besides that refusal would probably mean losing routine Foreign Office
and other government department news sources. The more than average
British citizen doesn't know even today how his government and
"independent" press took orders from Hitler.
In the latter part of January, 1938, the French Intelligence Service,
still not knowing of the secret deal Halifax had made, learned that
Hitler intended to invade Austria late in February and that
simultaneously both Italy and Germany, instead of withdrawing troops
as they had said they would, planned to intensify their offensive in
Spain. When the French Intelligence learned of it, M. Delbos, then
French Foreign Minister, and Eden were in Geneva attending a meeting
of the Council of the League. Delbos excitedly informed Eden who,
never dreaming that Great Britain had not only agreed to sacrifice
Austria and betray France but was also double-crossing her own Foreign
Minister, telephoned Chamberlain from Geneva.
The Prime Minister listened attentively, thanked him dryly, hung up,
and promptly telephoned Sir Eric Phipps, British Ambassador to France.
Sir Eric was instructed to get hold of M. Chautemps, the French
Premier at the time, and ask that Chautemps instruct Delbos to stop
frightening the British Foreign Secretary. But all during February the
French Intelligence kept getting more information about the planned
invasion of Austria and the proposed intensified offensive in Spain,
and relayed it to England with insistent suggestions for joint
precautions. Eden in turn relayed it to Chamberlain who always thanked
him.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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