Secret armies : $b the new technique of Nazi warfareSpivak, John L. (John Louis)
History
Secret armies : $b the new technique of Nazi warfare
Spivak, John L. (John Louis)
Fascism; Propaganda, German; Secret service -- Germany
The Austrian invasion was delayed for three weeks because of the
difficulty in getting Eden out. When the news flashed to a startled
world that Nazi troops were thundering into a country whose
independence Hitler had promised to respect, M. Corbin, the still
unsuspecting French Ambassador, rushed to the Foreign Office to
arrange for swift joint action. This was at four o'clock in the
afternoon of March 11, 1938. Instead of receiving him immediately,
Lord Halifax kept him waiting until nine o'clock in the evening. By
that time Austria was Nazi territory. There was nothing to do but
protest; so Lord Halifax, with a straight face, joined France in a
"strong protest." It was not until a week after Austria had been
absorbed that the French Intelligence Service learned the details of
the Halifax deal and finally understood why England had side-stepped
the pleas for joint action and why the French Ambassador had been kept
cooling his heels until the occupation of Austria was completed.
From Austria Hitler got more men for his army, large deposits of
magnesite, timber forests and enormous water-power resources for
electricity. From Czechoslovakia, if he could get it, Hitler would
have the Skoda armament works, one of the biggest in the world,
factories in the Sudeten area, be next door to Hungarian wheat and
Rumanian oil, dominate the Balkans, destroy potential Russian air and
troop bases in Central Europe, and place Nazi troops within a few
miles of the Soviet border and the Ukrainian wheat fields he has eyed
so long.
Five days after Austria was invaded, on March 16, at 3:30 in the
afternoon, Lord Halifax personally summoned the Czechoslovakian
Minister. At four o'clock the Minister came out of the conference with
a dazed and bewildered air. Lord Halifax had made some "suggestions."
Revealing complete ignorance of what had happened and was happening in
Czechoslovakian politics, Halifax was nevertheless laying down the
law.
It was obvious that the British Foreign Secretary was getting orders
from someone else, for Halifax suggested that the Central European
Republic try to conciliate Germany (which it had been doing for
months) and that a German be taken into the cabinet (there were
already three in it). On March 22 there was another meeting at which
the Minister learned that Halifax wanted the Czech Government to take
a Nazi into the cabinet--as Austria took Dr. Seyss-Inquart at Hitler's
orders.
This pressure from England for Czechoslovakian Nazis to be given more
power in the government was virtually telling the beleaguered little
democracy to fashion a strong rope and hang itself. Subsequent events
showed that Chamberlain personally supplied the rope.
Then came the historic week-end of March 26-27, 1938.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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