Secret Diplomacy: How Far Can It Be Eliminated?Reinsch, Paul S. (Paul Samuel)
Philosophy
Secret Diplomacy: How Far Can It Be Eliminated?
Reinsch, Paul S. (Paul Samuel)
Diplomacy; Europe -- Politics and government
The concept of diplomacy which has been criticized in these pages does
not exclude the possibility of immediate brilliant success; but its
ineffectiveness appears when we view it over longer periods of history.
It is built on too narrow a foundation. We have seen that even with
the greatest statesmen, any plan of action conceived in this manner
has such positive limitations that the very success in executing such
policies through a shrewd play of diplomatic forces, conjures up new
dangers and difficulties. The wisdom of no man nor small self-contained
group of men is at present sufficient to measure the needs of society
and to transform its impulses into effective action. A broader basis
for policy is needed. But the greatest weakness of the old method lies
in the fact that just at the very times when men are most in need of
confidence and of a spirit of reason and sane judgment, this mode of
action leaves the public mind in confusion, excitement and the darkest
fears.
If democracy means anything, its significance for the welfare of
humanity must lie in the value of allowing constantly more and more
minds to participate in the great things of the world. Not only would
such participation seem to be a natural right of the human mind but
also the things most worth while can be achieved only when the ablest
and best can freely lend their efforts. To all this a narrow system of
secret management by a limited hierarchy is hostile. The old diplomacy
rests entirely on skepticism as to the wisdom and self-control of
the people. The people are merely material for statesmanship. This
conception is blind to the fact that everything that is great in modern
life has arisen through the freedom with which talent may manifest
itself wherever found and that in all pursuits of humanity that are
worth while, innumerable minds coöperate, in a degree as warranted
by their capacity to bring about sound action and improvement. The
older diplomacy assumed that the people furnished only passive
material for statesmanship to work upon, and it saw in the public only
potentialities for vague and general influences which statesmanship in
turn was to mold and utilize. The greatest distance it went, was to
admit that national policy must rest on popular instinct; a principle
which is quite compatible with the practice of secret diplomacy. When
we come to talk of political instincts, however, we are dealing with
one of the vaguest and most indefinite concepts known to thought. These
instincts may be interpreted and given active expression as it suits
any diplomatic policy. Unfortunately the “instincts” most to the fore
are not usually helpful to calm and sound action. In international
affairs, an instinctive dislike or hatred of anything different has
again and again been made the basis of aggressive action, stirring
up otherwise peaceful populations to warlike and murderous intent.
Great national policies may often truly be said to rest on instinct
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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